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**SUMMARY VOLUME:
SOVIET STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY**

By: RICHARD PIPES RICHARD B. FOSTER JAMES E. DORNAN, JR.

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
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ABSTRACT

This summary volume of the Soviet Strategy and Foreign Policy study presents the preliminary findings of the pilot study; a summary of the input papers on Soviet foreign policy formulation and coordination in Europe; an analysis of the Soviet perception of detente; and a working hypothesis on how the USSR formulates and coordinates its foreign policy.

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FOREWORD

The Soviet Strategy and Foreign Policy pilot study undertakes to investigate the historico-strategic hypothesis regarding how the USSR formulates and coordinates the implementation of its foreign policy and to produce independent case studies of value for U.S. policymakers regardless of the validity of the working hypothesis. The study consists of an analysis of Soviet political, military and economic policies toward Western Europe; an examination of Soviet use of war by proxy; an exploration of Soviet perceptions of the United States and an integration of these tasks and other SSC studies to "test" the hypothesis whether the Soviets have a historico-strategic strategy and to identify its determinants.

The European summary presents a summary of the input papers on the interaction of the various instruments of Soviet foreign policy (diplomacy, military power, subversion, economic forces) with those factors in Western and Eastern Europe. The report on the Soviet view of detente analyzes how the Soviets perceive the United States and the concept of detente, emphasizing the historic and psychocultural factors influencing the conduct of Soviet foreign policy toward the United States.

The preliminary findings are divided into methodological and substantive categories and are still being reviewed. The working hypothesis addresses how the USSR formulates and coordinates foreign policy implementation based on the findings of the pilot study concentrating on the instrumentalities of foreign policy in regard to the Middle Eastern and European regions and Soviet "high strategy." This hypothesis will be further developed in proposed studies of Soviet foreign policy.

Dr. Richard Pipes, Senior Research Consultant to the Strategic Studies Center, was the Project Leader for this report.

Richard B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center

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SOVIET NATIONAL STRATEGY AS IT APPLIES TO FOREIGN POLICY:
A WORKING HYPOTHESIS

Richard B. Foster and Richard Pipes

This paper was published separately as Informal Note SSC-IN-74-35.
The paper sets forth the SSC's "working Hypothesis" on how the USSR
formulates and coordinates the implementation of foreign policy.

SOVIET NATIONAL STRATEGY AS IT APPLIES TO FOREIGN POLICY:
A WORKING HYPOTHESIS

The dominant attitudes toward Soviet foreign (and military) policy prevalent in the past several years in the United States may be defined under the headings of (1) "doctrinaire", (2) "pragmatic", (3) "behaviorist", and (4) "abstract model" approaches.

The "doctrinaire" approach is characterized by the "worldwide Communist conspiracy" outlook, with Soviet timetables for world conquest imputed to them, and victory in general nuclear war as an attainable and necessary aim for the USSR. This view of the USSR is largely discounted and will not be further discussed.

The proponents of the "pragmatic" view hold that in the conduct of its foreign relations the Soviet Union acts as does any other power, its primary objectives being safeguarding its security, increasing its economic power, and expanding its international influence. Communist ideology is essentially empty rhetoric.

The "behaviorists" concede that the Soviet leaders take their ideology seriously and entertain global ambitions. However, they discount the effect of ideology on Soviet political conduct on the grounds that human behavior is ultimately determined not by ideas but by experiences. In the final reckoning it does not greatly matter what the Soviet leaders want: their actions will be determined by what experience teaches them. The content of U.S.-USSR relations matters less than the fact that they exist and expand.

The "abstract model" approach has been largely developed by the systems analysts, scientists, and others concerned with analysis of nuclear war and its outcomes. In their view, the USSR is a mirror image of the United States in that nuclear war outcomes so dominate all other considerations--including

both history and foreign policy--that they become irrelevant or derivative. The United States and the USSR become, in effect, two giant weapon systems to be analyzed in terms of econometric models of decisionmaking about the only relevant consideration--deterrence of general nuclear war.

The latter three approaches--resting, respectively, on the pragmatic philosophy of William James, the behaviorist psychology of Watson, and the mathematical logics of the logical positivists and econometricists--reinforce one another.

The SSC's past analyses of Soviet foreign policy and military strategy suggest a fifth approach, which is being further explored as a "working hypothesis". This "historico-strategic" approach treats "ideology" (i.e., the non-"rational", nonpragmatic, global elements in Soviet thought) as a result of Soviet historic experience and the byproduct of the Soviet system. This experience and this system impel the Soviet leadership toward a long-term, integrated foreign policy, distinguished by a high degree of dynamism and coordination of the instruments of policy into a political "strategy" well anchored in the Russian historical legacy.

The basic postulates of the "strategic" approach to Soviet foreign policy may be summarized as follows:

1. The decisive factors which shape the political psychology of the Soviet elite are not those formed in the course of relatively limited contacts with the outside world; rather, they are the legacy of seven centuries of Russian statehood and of the unique political and economic system under which this Soviet elite grew up and learned the art of government.

2. The Soviet leaders and theoreticians who make up this elite make no secret of the fact that they regard their "scientific" approach to politics and global strategy as the weapon that will enable them ultimately to triumph over the West. "Scientific", in this context, means having long-term objectives as well as being coolly rational in the choice of means.

3. The authoritarian nature of the Soviet system does not permit purely pragmatic responses to shifting circumstances although the Soviets are alert to and exploit opportunities as they present themselves. The thrust of the system demands coordination and planning even of the exploitation of these opportunities.

4. Coordination and planning must be based on some conception of means and ends: this conception is what the Russians call "ideology". Ideology in the USSR is not empty rhetoric but the unwritten constitution within which the system as a whole operates.

5. This authoritarian nature of the Soviet system, precluding as it does a distribution of decisionmaking authority, mitigates against the adoption of a defensive strategy (insofar as the defender has less control over his forces than the attacker). The system encourages an offensive frame of mind and an offensive strategy. The Soviet government does not merely or even primarily respond to Western initiatives; it initiates policies on its own (although it is perfectly willing to let the West take the credit for them) to exploit, in a cautious, prudent fashion, vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the West.

6. The Soviet leadership proceeds in a manner characterized by a strong awareness of its principal strategic objectives, which are always dependent on the exigencies of political authority: its acquisition, protection, legitimation, and expansion. In so doing, it pays close attention to the "correlation of forces," carefully studying--in order to exploit--weaknesses and "contradictions" in the enemy camp and employing a very broad range of instrumentalities which the totalitarian nature of the regime makes available to it.

7. In the formulation and implementation of its national strategy, the Soviet leadership attaches extraordinary importance to the quality of strategic thinking about the application of the instruments of power--political, economic, technological, military, social, ideological, subversive--available to it.

If one were to highlight the differences which set off the "historico-strategic" approach to Soviet foreign policy from the "pragmatic", "behaviorist", and "abstract model" approaches, the following points would be emphasized: (1) that the driving forces of Soviet foreign policy lie internally, rooted in Russian history and in Russian domestic experiences rather than exclusively in the present and in external contacts, especially as they result from the nuclear equation; (2) that the spirit of Russian politics is activist and offensive rather than passive and defensive; (3) that Soviet politics are distinguished by the primacy of political factors and a high degree of coordination of the instrumentalities of policymaking; and (4) that the nuclear equation, although of very high importance in Soviet thinking, nevertheless constitutes only one element in an overall political-military-economic National Strategy as it applies to Soviet foreign policy.

Soviet National Strategy requires a three-part approach:

- Soviet "high strategy"--i.e., the principal theoretical "line" taken toward domestic and external problems, both within and without the Communist ("socialist") camp;
- The instrumentalities of policy: political, economic, technological, military, social, ideological, subversive;
- The regions in which the Soviet National Strategy works itself out.

A pilot project, undertaken on a modest scale, concentrated on the various instrumentalities of policy in regard to the European and Middle Eastern regions, attempting to pinpoint elements of coordination and the priorities on which they were based. Two other papers dealt with "high strategy": one dealt with the Soviet conception of detente, and the other with the coordination of Soviet policies toward Europe.

DETENTE AND SOVIET POLICY IN EUROPE: A COMMENT ON RECENT RESEARCH

James Dornan

This paper was published separately as Informal Note SSC-IN-75-2.

SUMMARY

It has become de rigueur among commentators on contemporary world politics to argue that we have reached or are nearing the end of the post-war era. Virtually all such commentators agree that a condition called "detente" is likely to be the central feature of international relations for the indefinite future. Many feel as well that epochal changes are occurring in the very structure of world politics itself which augur well for future peace and stability; more cautious observers content themselves with asserting, in the words of one of the contributors to this study, that at the very least "the frozen situation of the past between East and West has been thawing in notable respects."¹

Despite the emergence in recent years of an extensive literature dealing with these themes, however, there have been few attempts to evaluate with care the intentions and objectives of Soviet foreign policy in the era of detente, and the strategy and tactics being utilized in pursuit of Soviet goals. The Pipes Pilot Study is intended to be a pioneering first attempt at this task.

In the past, Western policymakers have not been notably successful in analyzing Soviet "high strategy." There is no widely accepted consensus among scholars and commentators regarding even the proper questions to be answered about Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, there remains widespread disagreement among students of Soviet affairs over the relative significance of such factors as the Russian national character, the

¹ Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Europe," p. 2.

Russian theory of international relations, the nature of the Soviet decisionmaking process, and the views of the present political elite in the development of the foreign policy of the USSR.

The reasons for this lack of consensus can readily be identified. The Russian penchant for--and success at achieving--a high degree of secrecy in the formulation of Soviet national objectives has denied Western observers access to the kinds of information normally available elsewhere. Secondly, the very nature of the regime itself presents obstacles to understanding. The USSR is a revolutionary state sui generis: its national political tradition, characterized by highly centralized domestic authority and a virtually unremitting expansionism abroad, has successfully assimilated a universalist ideology which purports to have uncovered the nature of the world historical process and which claims to embody as well an allegedly infallible plan for solving the primary problems of the human condition. Finally, Western--and especially American--efforts to understand Soviet foreign policy have been bedeviled by what Professor Pipes calls "mirror-imaging"; our political tradition, he points out, based to a considerable extent on the principle of equality, denies "any meaningful difference among human beings . . . and therefore blinds those who hold it to a great deal of human motivation."¹ So deeply ingrained is this outlook in the American psyche, Pipes argues, that it produces among U.S. decisionmakers a strong distaste for any sustained analysis of foreign civilizations.

As a consequence of these factors, we know far less than we would like to know about such fundamental issues as the precise way in which the Soviet leadership perceives the contemporary balance of world forces and its significance, and especially about the processes and factors which affect the way in which these perceptions develop in the Soviet leadership.

¹ Richard Pipes, "Detente: Moscow's View," pp. 2-3.

Nevertheless, there is much that can be known, particularly if the theory and practice of Soviet foreign policy are evaluated in the context of the Russian and the Soviet historical experience. Past studies sponsored by the SSC suggest the utility of a "historical-strategic" approach to the analysis of Soviet foreign policy. This approach postulates that the Soviet historic experience, in combination with the Soviet political system itself, impels the Soviet leadership toward a long-term, integrated foreign policy, a policy distinguished by a high degree of dynamism and a careful coordination of tactics. The result is a political strategy well anchored in the Russian historical legacy, aimed at maximizing Soviet power and influence in the global political system. In pursuing its objectives the Soviet leadership is molded primarily by the exigencies of political authority--its acquisition, protection, legitimation and expansion--and by an analysis of the instruments of power--political, economic, technological, military, social and ideological--available to it during any given period of time.

The present collection of studies goes far toward confirming the validity of this basic hypothesis. A consensus clearly exists among all the authors--who represent a wide assortment of backgrounds and who made use of a wide variety of sources both "open" and "closed" in the course of their research--on the proposition that the Soviet Union continues to pursue a long-range foreign policy which is inimical to the interests of the West. Insofar as there exists any appreciable disagreement on this subject among them, it is over the significance and likely duration of the more short-range strategy and tactics of Soviet policy.

The papers by Richard Pipes and Michel Tatu constitute an excellent foundation for the kind of research necessary for an understanding of current Soviet policy. Professor Pipes emphasizes, as he has in much of his earlier published work, the cardinal relationship between the domestic political structure of the USSR, particularly in its historical evolution and development, and Soviet foreign policy. If we are to understand the latter, he suggests, we need to examine carefully the social

structure of the Soviet Union, the role of "interest" groups in Soviet society, the nature of the Communist Party apparatus, and the historical tradition of the Soviet Union itself. Pipes himself has been engaged in such studies for a number of years, and presents many of his findings in the present paper. The Russian state, he observes, has historically exercised a "proprietary" or "patrimonial" system of authority over the nation and its inhabitants, a system which is reflected during the contemporary period in the "intrinsically illiberal and antidemocratic" ethos of the Russian ruling elite.¹ Pipes calls attention as well to certain fundamental economic and geopolitical factors which have helped condition Russian policy in both its domestic and international phases. Russia has historically been a poor country, unable to support a dense population due to a short growing season and other factors associated with climate. This has resulted in a relatively high degree of population mobility, which in turn has helped stimulate the drive to territorial expansion that is so marked a feature of Russian history. Its outward expansion, in turn, very early brought Russia into contact with a great variety of nations and races, thus supplying the Russian state with ample opportunity to learn the uses of power. As Pipes notes, "No other country has a comparable wealth of accumulated experience in the application of external and internal pressures on neighbors for the purpose of softening them prior to conquest."²

Equally significant, in the view of Professor Pipes (a view shared by Michel Tatu, the author of a companion paper in the present study), is the political background of the present Soviet elite. The current generation of Soviet rulers rose to power in the 1930s, and their "political socialization" involved acclimatization to a political system of a particularly barbaric variety, characterized by ruthless infighting of a sort rare in

¹ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

² Ibid., p. 9.

human history. The Soviet elite is moreover, for all practical purposes, directly descended from a peasantry, and a peasantry of a particular type at that: the Russian muzhik has survived generations of political and economic adversity by relying upon what Pipes calls "extreme cunning and a single-minded pursuit of his own interest," as well as on a conviction that "force is one of the surest means of getting one's own way."¹ These elements of the Russian historic experience combine to create a special kind of political mentality which stresses the permanence of self-interest and a totally manipulative approach to political power. That outlook, reinforced by Marxism-Leninism and by the major national experiences of the Soviet state since the Revolution of 1917, goes far toward explaining Soviet behavior in world affairs in the contemporary period.

Finally, Russian foreign policy cannot be understood without an apprehension of the results of the almost-complete coordination of the various instruments of power made possible by the nature of the decision-making system of the regime. As Tatu emphasizes, the Communist Party continues to control and direct almost all human activity in the nation insofar as it affects policy.² Thus the system has at its disposal enormous flexibility and an almost unique capability for foreign policy initiatives; unlike that of the United States, for example, the pattern of Soviet foreign policy is not primarily one of reaction to external events, but rather demonstrates substantial skill at the offensive thrust, which would make it a formidable rival for the United States in world affairs whatever its ideology or foreign policy objectives.

In their general approach to the study of Soviet policy and policy-making, then, the Pipes and Tatu papers offer much in the way of valuable insight. Both papers suggest as well--in what they contain and in what they do not contain--key areas for further research. More details are needed, for example, about the formative influences on present members of

¹ Ibid., p. 10.

² Michel Tatu, "Decisionmaking in the USSR," p. 3.

the ruling group. Differences in the political and social experiences which they have confronted may be as important as those they have experienced in common in evaluating their possible reaction to changing international circumstances, particularly as the temporal distance from the Revolution grows. Over time, incremental changes in the political perceptions of the elite may affect Soviet behavior in significant ways.

Moreover, it is important to learn to what extent and in precisely what ways control by the Party over the system has weakened. Tatu suggests that the Party is now more constrained than previously in its ability to manipulate the system to its own ends and in its own interest; its role, he argues, is now somewhat "ambiguous." The paper on the Soviet economy by the Pinders notes that "interest groups" have begun to emerge within the Soviet economic superstructure which may affect the ability of the Ministry of Foreign Trade to control the place of imports in the Soviet economy. It will be important to monitor these developments carefully, in order to discover whether such groups actually emerge, and the extent to which they begin to exercise actual power and influence. A final area worthy of additional research concerns the possible existence of divergent views on policy issues among different segments of the elite--the military, the party, and the managerial bureaucracy. Although such differences are often postulated and equally often denied (in the present instance by Tatu),¹ there has been little systematic research in this area. Even if there have been few such divergencies in the past, future patterns may be different.

In addition to presenting an overview of the sources of Soviet foreign policy, Professor Pipes provides a summary and analysis of the Soviet approach to detente. Here too he establishes the tone for many of the

¹ Ibid., p. 20.

inputs of the other contributors. There is no evidence to date, he suggests, that the Soviet strategy of detente involves any fundamental alteration of the long-range foreign policy objectives of the USSR. The Soviets appear to be interested primarily in reducing the possibility of military conflict with the United States and in gaining access to Western capital and technological know-how, during a period in which they perceive the world correlation of forces to be shifting in their favor. In pursuit of those ends, they continue to orchestrate, as they have in the past, the military, political, and economic tools of foreign policy in a manner calculated to maximize their gains and minimize their losses. As many of the other contributors to the study point out, however, this fundamental truth does not necessarily mean either that detente is likely to be of short duration or that the West has no stake in its continuation. On the contrary, the Western world has an equal interest in reducing the likelihood of strategic war and--a point not made by any of the contributors to this study--appears to have an interest as well in a period of reduced tensions in order to gain time to recover from its current political malaise and economic crisis.

Aside from the Pipes and Tatu papers, the principal focus of the present study is Communist policy in Europe--a focus which is appropriate enough, given the centrality of European issues to the Cold War since its inception and the continuing significance of Europe's place in the global balance of power. The current series of East-West negotiations on European questions has raised anew, in a form more sophisticated and therefore perhaps more troublesome than ever before in the postwar period, the most serious of challenges to U.S. and Western European policymakers. All of the contributors to the Pipes policy project agree that however Soviet foreign policy may evolve over the long term, the short-run policy of the USSR in Europe is clear. That policy is aimed at nothing more or less than detaching Europe from its present dependence upon the United States, especially with respect to defense, and replacing it with a dependence upon the Soviet Union. As Professor Pipes expresses it,

"Russian military power resting on a West European economic base would give the USSR indisputable world hegemony."¹

Herein lies the explanation for the continued massive Russian military presence in Europe, which has grown rather than diminished in recent years. Messrs. Wolfe and Erickson supply particularly thorough and up-to-date analyses of that presence. Wolfe's study is moreover especially valuable because of its thorough analysis of the extraordinary difficulties involved in measuring with any degree of precision the balance of military power between the blocs on the European front. Traditional "worst case" analyses, he reminds us, characteristically exaggerate Soviet superiority; the common alternative, the so-called "range of threats" approach, equally lacks utility since it tells us little about which threat is most likely to develop. All too often as well, analysts tend to shape the inputs of their evaluation to achieve the outcomes congenial to the agency sponsoring their study, in the process limiting their contribution to understanding.

The simpler yardsticks of comparison--those based on computing the numbers of divisions, tanks, artillery tubes, aircraft and the like possessed by the two sides--are particularly subject to this sort of manipulation. Manpower counts, for example, are sensitive to whether the "flanks" or only the central front are included in the analysis and to whether only combat manpower is enumerated. Armor counts depend on whether only tanks in operational service are counted or whether those in storage are also included. Moreover, if troops, tanks, and aircraft stationed in the areas of the USSR immediately adjacent to Europe are weighed in the balance, the Warsaw Treaty Organization advantages appear substantially larger.

¹ Pipes, op. cit., p. 21.

In any case, Wolfe and Erickson are agreed that the Warsaw Treaty Organization possesses what Wolfe calls a "preponderant advantage" in most of the key indices of power, with the possible exception of antitank weapons and tactical nuclear weapons--although Erickson insists that the traditional two-to-one Western superiority in numbers of the latter is rapidly disappearing. Both analysts agree as well that the Soviet Union possesses a substantial capacity for rapid reinforcement and mobilization in the early days after the outbreak of the war, a capacity that substantially exceeds that of the NATO nations. NATO's problems on the central front are further complicated by such factors as the geographic fragmentation of the NATO defense area, which is split by the "natural wedge" of Austria and Switzerland; by NATO's shallow rear and lack of elbow room for defensive regrouping and deployment in depth; by the location of important logistics and communication lines across the natural Russian line of advance; and by the maldistribution of American forces away from the segment of the front where their presence would be most immediately required.

All of this suggests that NATO's fortunes in the event war occurs in Europe will depend to a dangerous extent upon the amount of strategic warning time available and by the length of the war. Wolfe appears somewhat more sanguine than Erickson that sufficient warning will be available; skeptics may be pardoned for siding with Professor Erickson.

In any case, all the military advantages do not lie with the Warsaw forces. Western armored vehicles such as the American M-60, the German Leopard, and the British Chieftain possess more accurate firepower and greater operational efficiency than their WTO counterparts, although Wolfe doubts that these qualitative advantages offset the numerical imbalance in armored forces favoring the WTO. Neither Wolfe nor Erickson analyzes in any detail the possible impact of new technologies on this equation, or for that matter on the military balance in Europe generally. It is said to be an axiom of military strategy that the offensive power requires a substantial--how substantial has always been a matter of dispute--margin of superiority over the defensive power in order to prevail.

This raises several questions. Does this axiom remain true under present conditions? How will it be affected by new and emergent technologies? Many students of weapons technology believe that the advent of such weapons as wire and electro-optically guided antitank weapons, precision-guided munitions, and the like will substantially redress the military balance in Europe and concomitantly improve the position of the NATO forces vis-a-vis their WTO opponents. It is not possible yet to render judgment on these claims, and detailed analyses are badly needed.

Should the impact of the new weapons cut both ways or for other reasons be less favorable to the West than some observers expect, the military advantages enjoyed by the WTO would appear to limit significantly the strategic options available to the West should war occur in Europe. Most significantly, the result of these advantages would appear certain to result in a lowered nuclear threshold; the West would appear to have no alternative to early use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a substantial Russian assault across the central front. Yet it is not clear that the NATO powers possess either the doctrine, the weapons systems, or the command and control and "release" capabilities and procedures necessary to utilize nuclear weapons in a manner calculated to stop a Russian advance. Both Wolfe and Erickson emphasize that Soviet theater doctrine continues to favor the offensive. Erickson--here in some disagreement with Wolfe--suggests that Soviet military planners have begun to give serious attention to the possibility that a war in Europe could pass through a prolonged conventional phase and that the use of even tactical nuclear weapons might be avoided entirely. Erickson pays particular attention to analyzing the operational offensive capabilities of the WTO forces; he notes as well the possible utility of growing Soviet naval power in the event of war in Europe, and suggests that the continuing military buildup of the WTO generally raises the possibility of a move against either the southern or the northern flank of NATO, whatever developments occur on the central front. While Wolfe suggests that the likelihood of a major war in Europe is remote at present due to the Soviet Union's primary interest in the detente relationship with the West, Erickson concludes

with the pessimistic appraisal that the military threat posed by the WTO to NATO has grown substantially in recent years and argues that "in the final outcome, Europe may well become that 'low risk option' which will suit the Soviet command perfectly."¹

Obviously only a war could provide a conclusive test of the stability of the military balance in Europe. Despite his pessimism, Erickson would most likely agree with most of the authors involved in this study that a major war in Central Europe is not probable in the near term. This judgment, even if true, may nonetheless provide few reasons for complacency. For, as Robert Osgood long ago reminded us, the extra-military uses of military strategy and force deployments have assumed a heightened significance in contemporary world politics. Lothar Ruehl calls particular attention to this fact in his paper, which deals primarily with Soviet political strategies in Western Europe under conditions of detente. "Weak countries," he reminds us, "tend to appease the dominant power by adapting their national interests to the demands of greater power: security in the international system is then defined according to the requirements of the dominant power."² This, he tells us, is the real threat of "Finlandization" in the contemporary era, and points to the reality of usable military power in our time. It is in this context as well that Professor Pipes' warning that the Soviet Union will almost certainly continue to rely on military power for the pursuit of its policy objectives because all other techniques which it has employed have failed may take on special significance.

These remarks suggest as well the importance of the strategic weapons balance for Soviet foreign policy, both generally and in the European theatre. None of the contributors to the present study deal in more than cursory fashion with this issue; even Wolfe mentions it only in passing,

¹ John Erickson, "Soviet Military Postures and Policy in Europe," p. 36.

² Lothar Ruehl, "Soviet Policy Towards Western Europe and Domestic Politics," p. 25.

and Professor Pipes contents himself with suggesting that the present Soviet military buildup may signal their intention to seek a usable first-strike capability. Whatever the possibility of the latter, a more likely eventuality is surely an attempt by the Soviet Union to exploit its substantial numerical advantage in certain key indices of strategic power on behalf of its political objectives in Europe. Other SSC studies have accentuated European fears over this possibility, and it would be difficult to maintain that these fears are exaggerated. In a seminal study published a decade ago, Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush noted that the Soviets have been much more aggressive than the West in attempting to utilize nuclear weapons for political purposes, even when substantially inferior to the West in the size and quality of their strategic force. Horelick and Rush observed that the USSR "made broad and differentiated use of strategic threats in support of a wide range of offensive foreign policy objectives in the late 1950s and early 1960s";¹ it would be prudent to anticipate the possibility that Soviet policy will manifest even less restraint when, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, their strategic arsenal will in many significant respects be superior to our own.

The possible goals of the Soviet military buildup must be the subject of additional intensive research. More careful investigation into the possible political uses of military "superiority" under conditions of detente and "mutual assured destruction" is also badly needed. One of the primary purposes of the present Soviet buildup may well be psychological: in addition to achieving equal "status" with the United States in global politics, the Soviets have acquired a political weapon which might be most effective when directed against a Western Europe already enfeebled by current social and economic crises. Surprisingly, none of the papers examine in any detail the capacity of the West European nations to deal with such exigencies.

¹ Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1965)).

The papers by Lothar Ruehl and K.F. Cviic address themselves primarily to Soviet political objectives and tactics in Western and Eastern Europe. Ruehl observes that efforts by the Soviets in the immediate postwar period to utilize the Communist parties and other Communist-dominated organizations in Western Europe to achieve their political objectives in Western Europe largely failed; indeed, in many cases they were counterproductive, serving to draw masses of voters outside the mainstream of the European political systems and in the process insuring the victory of center-rightist coalitions in Italy, France and elsewhere. The Soviets abandoned this approach some time ago, Ruehl notes, and are not likely to return to it in the age of detente. On the contrary, they have clearly decided upon a strategy of using all available political tactics to promote their aims, especially including approaches to orthodox political parties and organizations. In the age of detente, such tactics offer considerable possibility for success. The publics of Western Europe are clearly weary of the sacrifices demanded by the Cold War and appear at the moment psychologically incapable of viewing the Soviet threat with the same degree of alarm as was the case in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Moreover, Western Europe has become accustomed to the existing status quo in Europe, including the large Russian military presence there: that presence has not appeared to inhibit the development of a lifestyle of affluence or in any way to impede the politics of normalcy. Finally, in recent years, as Ruehl observes, the word "detente" has "acquired a mystical quality and become a symbol with an intrinsic value of its own--a value not to be questioned by skeptical judgment for fear that it might vanish because of its fragility."¹

Thus the Soviets have attempted a variety of "open" approaches to the political parties of Western Europe, especially to those left-of-center: invitations have been extended to groups of parliamentarians

¹ Ruehl, op. cit., p. 20.

to visit the Soviet Union, scientific and educational delegations have been exchanged, and observers have been sent to meetings of Western parties. There have even been direct attempts to influence elections, as when Gromyko visited Scheel during the Hessen electoral campaign of 1970. The Soviets have even been willing to work with political forces and parties of the right, clearly favoring the Gaullists in France in recent years, for example, over their communist and socialist adversaries.

The question still remains, of course, to what extent are the nations of Western Europe willing to accept Soviet predominance on the continent as a precondition to security and peace? Pipes suggests in his paper that one of the favorite political tactics of the Soviets is to try to reduce all politics to the issue of preserving the peace, in the process attempting to portray any opposition to Soviet demands as warmongering or worse. It remains to be seen whether Soviet success in employing these tactics will increase if the military balance continues to tilt in the favor of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Several of the authors suggest that, whatever may be the Soviets' long-range objectives, the USSR fears a precipitate American withdrawal from Europe under present circumstances. The Soviets can not help but view with alarm, according to this argument, the possibility that an American withdrawal might stimulate a massive European rearmament program and even the development of a significant European deterrent which would postpone for the indefinite future the achievement of political hegemony by the Soviets over the continent. It is difficult to find any substantive evidence to support this argument. None of the authors attempt to analyze Soviet perceptions of the state of West European morale, nor do they indicate whether or not in their view there are many reasons for the Soviet Union to believe that Western Europe would respond positively to an American renunciation of any security interests on the continent. Indeed, available evidence indicates the contrary: it seems likely that an American withdrawal from Europe would result in the final demoralization of the West European populations, and their gradual acceptance of a preeminent Soviet rule in Western Europe.

In any case, all the contributors agree that such a rule remains the ultimate Soviet objective in Europe. Although Pipes and Ruehl both refer in passing to attempts by the Soviet Union to facilitate the achievement of its objectives by an active strategy of subversion and penetration of the West European political structures, neither pays detailed attention to precisely how successful the Soviets have been in this area to date. Communist influence in many of the key trade unions of Western Europe is known to be pronounced; detailed study of the possible significance of this influence on the political future of Europe remains to be undertaken. A former member of Prime Minister Wilson's cabinet has recently suggested that there is extensive communist influence over the British Labour Party, extending even to that party's House of Commons delegation. Again, a detailed analysis of the extent of this influence is badly needed. Similar comments might be made about France and West Germany, the latter assuming particular interest in view of the Guillaume affair. Depending on future developments of this nature, it is not altogether clear that the Soviet Union will indefinitely prefer rightist regimes to leftist ones in its dealings with political forces in Western Europe.

Mr. Cviic analyzes Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. He notes no slackening of Soviet interest in the maintenance of their East European empire, nor any serious loosening in their span of control. In the period of detente, however, the Soviets may be somewhat constrained in the tactics they may safely employ to control the course of events in the East European nations. Thus their attempt to induce the West to accept publicly the status quo in Europe assumes a particular significance: the USSR hopes to detach the hopes of the local populations to enjoy a better life from their hopes for change in the political status quo, while at the same time working to defuse discontent by providing the citizens with the opportunity for a more satisfactory better material existence. The "kadarization" program in Hungary, Cviic suggests, is instructive here, as is the intensive ideological drive undertaken in recent years to counter the "dangerous byproducts of consumerism."

Over the longer haul, Cvivic suggests, the Soviets obviously plan to continue and deepen the present policy of integrating the East European countries as closely as possible into the Soviet system. The armies of Eastern Europe are already nearly totally integrated with the forces of the USSR, with the notable exception of Romania. Attempts to promote foreign policy cooperation through the WTO Political Consultative Committee continue. Above all, there has been no diminution of the campaign to integrate the economies of the East European states more closely with that of the Soviet Union: a "comprehensive program on socialist economic integration" was announced in 1971 with considerable fanfare, and at the end of 1973 several COMECON international associations were created to help with the integration of the textile machinery, nuclear power, and electrical engineering industries. Cvivic suggests as well that in the wake of the recurring military and political unrest in the Middle East the Soviets may attempt a more activist policy towards Yugoslavia. The recent wooing of the Yugoslav army and widespread praise in the Soviet press for Tito's "struggle against the enemies of socialism" may well signal new directions to come.

Cvivic does not provide us, however, with sufficient information to evaluate possible trends in Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. His paper does not go into detail on relations between the Soviet and East European communist parties, and even less concerning the extent of East European economic dependence upon the Soviet Union. There is room for considerable detailed research in both these areas. It remains equally uncertain whether the Soviet Union has decided upon a definitive strategy to deal with Yugoslavia; such a strategy will surely have to await the death of Tito and a consequent evaluation of likely trends in Yugoslav politics under those circumstances.¹

¹ See, e.g., recent charges by the Yugoslav press agency that the Soviet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda is supporting Bulgaria in a longstanding dispute over the future of Macedonia (New York Times, 9 March 1975).

As noted earlier, virtually all the contributors to the study are agreed that economic considerations are among the primary Soviet motives for pursuing the policy commonly characterized as "detente." There is equal agreement among them that the policy of detente itself affords the Soviet Union unusual opportunities for the utilization of economic weapons to achieve its political objectives in Western Europe. The papers by John and Pauline Pinder and by Philip Hanson and Michael Kaser analyze various aspects of these two interrelated dimensions of Soviet economic policy in Europe.

The Hanson and Kaser contribution emphasizes that basic Soviet trade policy has traditionally reflected the autarkic preferences of Soviet economic planners. An attempt is made to calculate the nature and quantity of imports necessary to fulfill the basic economic plan, and sufficient exports are then programmed to pay for them, with favorable trade balances further specified to furnish development aid to client states and to retain a minimum currency reserve for international liquidity purposes. In recent years there has been some move in the direction of allowing comparative evaluation of home and foreign prices and costs, but this has thus far not been allowed to disrupt the essential pattern of plan-formulation at home. Under this approach, there has developed no extensive "economic dependence" of the Soviet Union upon Western Europe.

In recent years, however, Soviet policymakers have publicly asserted that the Soviet Union requires new industrial processes and new types of machinery and materials--available only in the West--in order to complete the process of economic modernization embarked upon during the Khrushchev period. Hanson and Kaser conclude, on this basis, that "technology transfer" has become the most important issue for the USSR in its developing trade relations with the West. Until now, they point out, there has been little capital transfer from West to East; the West has not hitherto been a large source of borrowing to finance Soviet programs nor has it

provided a major relief from pressure on investment goods production capacity in the USSR.

Technology transfer, however, presents a different set of issues. Hanson and Kaser define technology transfer as any process by which innovations in one country are subsequently introduced into another with some resort to the experience of the innovator. The transfer of technology can be accomplished in a number of ways: the recipient country can learn from the applied research stage of the original innovation process; it can acquire knowledge of the basic idea and of some design features of the original process; or it can simply purchase a machine and attempt to replicate it on its own. The acquisition of technology must therefore be distinguished from its assimilation. The mere acquisition of a new technology does not necessarily mean that a recipient nation can catch up with the innovator and move quickly on to the next stage of process development as quickly as the innovator.

Mere aggregate totals reflecting increases in, e.g., machinery imports, are therefore an imperfect guide to the extent and significance of technology transfer between two nations. Nonetheless, such figures do provide us with clear indications of national intentions. Hanson and Kaser call attention to the highly selective purchasing policy of the Soviet Union: the Soviets have concentrated on the acquisition of particular types of machinery, as opposed to importing whatever machinery is relatively cheap. Nonetheless, they point out, Soviet imports remain relatively small in relation to the Soviet domestic economy, even though in current prices the volume of such imports has grown rapidly. When the inflation factor is taken into account, imports of Western machinery in real terms did not clearly and substantially outpace the growth of Soviet domestic equipment investment between 1956 and 1971. The authors conclude that negotiable technology transfer from Western Europe has probably been of considerable importance in the development of certain previously neglected branches of the Soviet economy such as chemicals, the motor industry, food processing, some segments of light industry, timber, and

computers. But it would be hard on the face of it, they argue, to assert that this transfer has been a quantitatively large source of Soviet economic growth.

The Pinders are primarily concerned with the possible future development of a West European economic dependence upon the USSR, which might make it possible for the Soviet Union to advance its political aims in Western Europe by the selective exercise of economic pressure. They evince little concern on this score. They point out that the European Economic Community's exports to the communist bloc constitute less than one percent of the gross Community capital product. Neither are they greatly concerned about the future. They conclude that the relative bargaining capability of the Soviet Union is not substantial and that the Soviet Union does not possess a notable capacity to significantly influence the terms of trade in their favor. The Soviets might be able to reap short-term advantages should the West European countries compete among themselves for Soviet trade, accepting unfavorable terms in the bargain, but the Pinders appear convinced that such a development can readily be avoided.

Even in particular resource or commodity areas, the Pinders see little likelihood of the development of a substantial European dependence on the Soviet Union. In the supply of energy, they point out, the USSR acting on its own cannot exert more than a marginal influence. They see little possibility that the Soviets will be able to exercise control over Middle Eastern supplies. They concede, however, that problems may develop in particular areas. A growing German dependence on supplies of natural gas from the USSR may put Bavaria in an exposed position in the future, and Austria has already developed a substantial dependence upon the USSR for energy supplies. Such dependencies, should they expand, might be exploited by the Soviets in a variety of ways. Supplies of critical materials might be withheld during periods of political tension, thus causing unemployment and social unrest in the dependent nations. The Pinders point out that some scholars believe that economic pressures

of this sort exerted upon Finland in late 1958 were successful from the Soviet point of view. It is worth noting as well that Soviet imports from Britain stagnated after the expulsion of 105 members of the Soviet embassy staff in an espionage scandal during the early days of the Heath government. More recently--although too recently for the Pinders to have taken note of it in their paper--the Wilson regime has attempted to rectify the substantial imbalance in Britain's trade with the Soviet Union, in the process accepting terms which have been the subject of much controversy in London.

More likely, however, is the possibility that the Soviets will simply choose to increase trade with nations which they regard favorably, or which they wish to influence. The examples of France in the de Gaulle period and of Germany under the Brandt coalition come immediately to mind. Whether the kinds of economic arrangements which the Soviets are likely to offer their favored nations will be sufficient to cause significant changes in the political policies pursued by such countries remains at this moment unclear. The Pinders provide detailed analyses of past trade patterns between the European Community nations and the Eastern bloc, noting in particular that the imports of the Europeans were primarily of food and raw materials while their exports consisted overwhelmingly of manufactured products or materials. Clearly the East believes that it is quicker and cheaper to import technology and know-how from the West than to invest in R and D in certain specified areas; at the very least the West has valuable market skills and flexible supplies that can be used as insurance against market failures. In the future, the Pinders suggest, East-West trade patterns will be affected by the rise of the "cooperative agreement" between the USSR and Western nations, the rate of Soviet technological progress, the extent to which the Soviets are able to earn hard currency by exporting raw materials, and the emergence of the United States and Japan as trading rivals for Europe with the Eastern bloc.

Once again, however, there is ample room for additional research to illuminate further many of the issues raised by both papers. Two-way trade between the two blocs needs to be monitored very carefully, in order to develop precise information on the significance for the Soviet economy of imports from Western Europe in key areas, and vice versa. Neither paper discusses the recently evinced Soviet interest in acquiring highly specialized technological know-how from the West, especially in the computer field; it has been suggested by some commentators that the Soviet Union seeks advanced computer technology from the West in order to improve the capacity of the regime to manage the Soviet economy, but the possible military significance of desired Soviet purchases in certain areas cannot be overlooked.

It is also worth noting that the Soviets have exhibited considerable skill of late in managing their relations with Western firms anxious to do business in the Soviet Union. They have employed hard-nosed bargaining techniques and exhibited considerable inflexibility on such contract terms as adjustments for inflation. Some commentators have criticized the United States for allowing American business firms by themselves, without official direction, to make decisions with significant consequences for the domestic economy and even for the national security. American business organizations, in fact, are largely unqualified to address such questions, and up to now the U.S. government has developed no overall policy on U.S. trade with the Eastern bloc and established no single monitoring body to follow carefully emergent trade patterns.¹ These and related areas require further investigation.

The eight input papers to the Pilot Study constitute an excellent foundation for further detailed research into the strategy and tactics

¹ For a useful discussion of these and related points, see Linda Hudak, "Soviet Trade: Profit v. Policy," Washington Post (18 December 1974).

employed by the Soviet Union in the era of detente. The earlier SSC Informal Note by Richard Pipes and Richard B. Foster, "Soviet Strategy Formulation and Coordination: Preliminary Findings of the Pilot Study and Observations on the Working Hypothesis," contains a detailed statement of conclusions drawn from the papers and from related research and analysis; these conclusions need not be repeated here. Ongoing and future SSC research should establish further evidence of the validity of the hypothesis, and provide data for appropriate modifications to be made in it where necessary as well as additional information useful for the evaluation of specific Soviet policies in various parts of the world.

DETENTE: MOSCOW'S VIEW

Richard Pipes

This paper was published separately as Technical Note SSC-TN-2625-3. The paper opens with a description of some of the factors embedded in Russian history and their influence on the Russian political mind. It then proceeds to trace the circumstances which caused the post-Stalinist leadership to opt for a "soft" strategy toward the West. The next section deals with major strategic objectives of detente, as seen from Moscow, followed by an analysis of some of the tactics employed to attain them. The final part discusses the balance sheet of detente as it might be drawn up by Moscow.

DETENTE: MOSCOW'S VIEW

A. Soviet Historical Background

In the accounts they left behind, travelers who visited Russia from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries liked to stress the unusually low business ethics of the native population. What struck them was not only that Russian merchants, shopkeepers, peddlers, and ordinary muzhiks engaged in the most impudent cheating, but that when found out they showed no remorse. Rather than apologize, they shrugged the matter off by quoting a proverb which from frequent repetition became very familiar to resident Westerners: "It is the pike's job to keep the carps awake." This version of caveat emptor—"let the buyer beware"—not only enjoins the customer to look out for his interests but it also implies that if he is hoodwinked the fault is his, insofar as the pike (in this case the seller) has a nature-given right to gobble up unwary fish. It is a distillation of centuries of experience, a kind of folkish anticipation of Social Darwinism, to which a large majority of the Russian population (with the notable exception of the intelligentsia) has learned to adhere, whether placed by fortune in the role of pike or of its potential victim.

* * *

All people tend to some extent to base their understanding of foreign civilizations on personal experience and self-image, and to assume that underneath the cloak of even the most exotic exterior there works the same mind and beats the same heart. But no one is more prone to work on this assumption than a person whose occupation is commerce and political creed liberalism. The idea of human equality, the noblest

achievement of "bourgeois" culture, is also the source of great political weakness because it denies any meaningful differences among human beings, whether genetic, ethnic, racial, or other, and therefore blinds those who hold it to a great deal of human motivation. Such differences as cannot be ignored because they are too obvious, the commercial-liberal mind likes to ascribe to uneven levels of economic opportunity or development and the cultural lag which allegedly results. The most probable cause of this outlook, and the reason for its prevalence, lies in the contradiction between the "bourgeois" ideal of equality and the undeniable fact of widespread inequality. His outlook enables the "bourgeois" to benefit from advantages without experiencing guilt, since as long as all men are presumed to be identical, those who happen to be better off may be said to owe their benefits to personal merit. In the United States, a country whose underlying culture is heavily influenced by the commercial ethos and liberal ideology, this way of thinking is very common. Among the mass of the people it assumes the form of a spontaneous and rather endearing good will toward foreigners, accompanied by an unconscious and (to foreigners) irritating assumption that the American way is the way. Among the more learned, it conceals itself behind theoretical facades which appear supremely sophisticated but on closer inspection turn out to be not all that different from the ideas held by the man on the street. The theories of "modernization" which in their various guises have acquired great vogue among American sociologists and political scientists since World War II, stripped of their academic vocabulary, say little more than that once all the people of the globe attain the same level of industrial development as the United States they will behave like Americans.

This outlook is so deeply ingrained in the American psyche, it is so instinctively and tenaciously held, that it produces among U.S. legislators, diplomats, and other politicians a strong distaste for any sustained analysis of foreign civilizations, since such analysis might (indeed, almost certainly would) require recognition of permanent cultural pluralities and call for an effort at learning and imagination

not required by its more comforting alternative. It is probably true that only those theories of international relations have any chance of acceptance in the United States, especially on the operative level, which postulate a fundamental identity of all human aspirations with the American ideal. It is probably equally true that no major power can conduct a successful foreign policy which is unwilling to recognize that there exist in the world the most fundamental differences in the psychological makeup and aspirations of its diverse inhabitants.

The current policy of "detente," as practiced in Washington, is no exception to these rules. To this writer, it appears to be without theoretical underpinnings and repose on nothing more substantial than a vaguely felt and inarticulated faith that the march of human events follows the script written by the Founding Fathers, and that if one can only avoid general war long enough all will be well. We are told that detente is necessary because the only alternative to it is a return to the Cold War with its confrontations and danger of nuclear holocaust. This, however, is an appeal to fear, not to reason. When pressed further, the defenders of detente justify it with offhand allusions to that "web of interests" which allegedly enmeshes the Soviet Union with the rest of the world and compels it to behave like any other responsible member of the international community--as if a metaphor were a substitute for evidence and analysis. A persuasive argument in favor of detente would call for a close investigation of the internal situation in the Soviet Union, as it was, is, and becomes, insofar as a basic postulate of this policy holds that its pursuit will exert a lasting influence on the mind and behavior of those who run the USSR. It would require, at the very least, an inquiry into the social structure of the USSR, the various "interest groups," the Communist party apparatus, the internal agitation and propaganda as they relate to detente, Soviet public opinion, and the Soviet government's ability to maintain its internal controls. It would seek to explain certain seeming contradictions between the Soviet government's professions of detente and such of its actions as incitement of its population to "ideological warfare" against the West, the maintenance of an unabated pace of armaments, and the appeals recently made to the Arabs to persevere with their oil embargo. Furthermore, it would

analyze the probable effects of detente on the Western alliance system, on the morale of the dissidents and the non-Russian inhabitants of the Soviet Union, and on American-Chinese relations. It would try to do this and much more that is clearly relevant. But in fact little if any such analysis has been attempted.

What makes such failure inexcusable is that the other party to detente certainly has done its homework. Whatever the limitations of their understanding of the United States (and they are formidable), the leaders of the Soviet Union have at least made the mental effort to place themselves in the position of the U.S. government and American public opinion. With the help of the expertise available at their international research institutes, such as IMEMO and ISShA, they have devised a policy of detente which serves their immediate interests without threatening to jeopardize their long-term aspirations. They at least know what it is they want and how to try to go about getting it by objectively analyzing Western strengths and weaknesses. And although the results of detente to date have not justified the Politburo's most sanguine expectations, thanks to an effort to understand its rival it at least has managed to extract more from him than it has had to concede.

The purpose of this paper is to try to show how detente is viewed in Moscow. Much attention is given to internal factors, it being the author's conviction that in Russia, as elsewhere, political thinking and behavior are largely shaped by experience gained in the arena of domestic politics. The argument in favor of this hypothesis is that politicians make their careers within a national power apparatus and, as a rule, gain the right to conduct their country's international affairs only after having successfully fought their way to the top of an internal (domestic) power structure. (At any rate, the contrary almost never happens.) Foreign policy is thus an extension of domestic politics: it involves the application outside of habits acquired at home. The

approach is also historical. Experience indicates that a country's internal politics evolve much more gradually and are much more resistant to change than its foreign politics. It should be apparent that this approach differs fundamentally from that underlying the present Administration's approach to detente. The latter appears to assume the primacy of international politics (i.e., the decisive impact of international relations on a country's domestic politics) and to ignore historic experience in favor of a "behavioral" response to the immediately given situation.

* * *

The first historic fact to be taken into account when dealing with the political life of Russia is that country's peculiar governmental tradition. For economic and geopolitical reasons which cannot be gone into here, during the nearly seven centuries that have elapsed since the founding of the Moscow monarchy the Russian state has claimed and, to the extent permitted by its limited means, actually exercised a kind of "proprietary" or "patrimonial" authority over the land and its inhabitants.¹

¹ The historical evolution of this type of state authority is the subject of my forthcoming book, Russia Under the Old Regime (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974).

In a regime of this type, the government and its bureaucratic-military service elite feel that the country literally belongs to them, and that in their capacity as its administrators and defenders they have the right to live at its expense without being obliged to render accounts to anyone. Although Russian history has known several "liberal" interludes--notably the reigns of Catherine II and Alexander II--when attempts were made to depart from this "patrimonial" tradition, these proved short-lived and produced no lasting effects. By expropriating all the "productive wealth" and much private property besides, the Soviet regime has dramatically reverted to this tradition (although such certainly had not been its founders' intention). In Communist Russia, as in Muscovite Rus', the government with its bureaucratic and military elites own the country. No comforts or privileges in the USSR can be acquired save by favor of the state; and none are likely to be retained unless that state remains internally frozen and externally isolated.

This basic fact of Russian history has had many consequences for the modus operandi of Russian politicians, whatever the regime and its formal ideology. One of them of especial relevance to detente is the intrinsically illiberal, antidemocratic spirit of Russian ruling elites. In "capitalist" countries it lies in the interest of the elite composed of property owners to restrain the powers of the state, because the latter is an adversary who, by means of taxes, regulations, and the threat of nationalization, prevents it from freely disposing of its wealth. In a Communist state where such "property" as exists is merely conditional possession dispensed by and held at the grace of the state, the elite has an interest in preventing any diminution of the state's power since this would inevitably result in the mass of the population demanding an account as well as claiming its rightful share. The Soviet elite, therefore, instinctively dislikes democratic processes, social initiative, and private property at home and abroad. In its relations with foreign powers (except those it intends to disintegrate and absorb) it prefers to deal on a state-to-state basis, preferably on a "summit" level, bypassing as much as possible unpredictable legislatures. Because

it fears emboldening its own citizenry, it objects to people-to-people contacts, unless suitably chaperoned. Nor is it averse to corrupting democratic processes in foreign countries. In its relations with the United States, the Soviet government has placed its authority squarely behind the President in his various contests with Congress. Thus, in violation of accepted international practices, during President Nixon's recent (June 1974) visit to Moscow, Brezhnev publicly sided with him against Congressional critics of his foreign policy. The Soviet government has also openly encouraged private lobbies (e.g., the National Association of Manufacturers) to apply pressure on Congress on its behalf, and urged the Administration in insubtle ways to bypass Congress in concluding various agreements with it. Entering into business arrangements with European governments and private enterprises, the Soviet government has been known to insist on secrecy which, in the long run, also tends to subvert democratic procedures.¹ In countries of the so-called "Third World," representatives of the USSR openly exhort local governments to strengthen the "public" sector of the economy at the expense of the private.² Just as the capitalist entrepreneur feels most comfortable in an environment where everybody pursues his private profit, so the Soviet elite prefers to be surrounded by regimes of the "patrimonial" type run by elites like itself.

Secondly, attention must be called to the persistent tradition of Russian expansion. Its causes should be sought not in racial or cultural propensities (as a matter of fact, Russians are not noted for imperialist fantasies and dislike leaving their homeland) but rather in the same

¹ It is reported, for instance, that the Finnish government, which owing to Soviet pressures must pay nearly double the prevailing world price for the oil it imports from the USSR, is also pressured not to reveal this unpalatable act to its citizenry (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 June 1974). Similarly, in their dealings with private West European banks Russia and the "Peoples' Democracies" are insisting, with apparent success, on a high degree of secrecy: Christopher Wilkins in The Times (London), 17 December 1973.

² Much evidence to this effect can be found on the pages of USSR and Third World published in London by the Central Asian Research Center.

economic and geopolitical factors which account for Russia's peculiar tradition of government. Climate and topography conspire to make Russia a poor country, unable to support a population of high density: among such negative factors are an exceedingly short agricultural season, abundant rainfall where the soil is poor and unreliable rainfall where it is fertile, and great difficulties of transport (big distances, severe winters, etc.). The result has been unusually high population mobility, a steady outflow of the inhabitants in all directions, away from the historic center of Great Russia in the taiga, a process which, to judge by the censuses of 1959 and 1970, continues unabated. The movement is partly spontaneous, partly government-sponsored. It is probably true that no country in recorded history has expanded so persistently and held on so tenaciously to every inch of conquered land. It is estimated, for example, that between the middle of the sixteenth century and the end of the seventeenth, Russia had conquered territory the size of the modern Netherlands every year for 150 years running. Not surprisingly, it has been the one imperial power after World War II not only to refuse to give up the colonial acquisitions made by its "feudal" and "bourgeois" predecessors, but to increase them by the addition of new dependencies acquired during the war in Eastern Europe and the Far East. Nothing can be further from the truth than the often heard argument that Russia's expansion is due to its sense of insecurity and need for buffers. Thanks to its topography (immense depth of defense, low population density, and poor transport) Russia has always been and continues to be the world's most difficult country to conquer, as Charles XII, Napoleon, and Hitler each found out in turn. As for buffers, it is no secret that today's buffers have a way of becoming tomorrow's homeland which requires new buffers to protect it. Indeed, a great deal of Soviet military activity in Western Europe in recent years has been justified by the alleged need to defend Russia's interests in Eastern Europe which Russia had originally acquired with the tacit acquiescence of the West as a buffer zone. It is far better to seek the causes of Russian expansionism in internal impulses at the root of which lie primarily economic conditions and the habits which they breed.

In this connection it deserves note that the population movement which initially took the form of spontaneous colonization and in time became increasingly dependent on conquest had from the earliest times brought Russians into intimate contact with a great variety of nations and races. It has taught them how to handle "natives" and how to exploit to their advantage "contradictions" present in neighboring countries for the purpose of weakening and subverting them preparatory to annexation. To understand some of the techniques presently employed on a global scale by Soviet diplomacy one can do no better than study the history of Moscow's conquest of Novgorod (15th century), the Golden Horde (16th century), and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (18th century), as well as the efforts of Imperial Russia (largely frustrated by Western countermeasures) to partition the Ottoman Empire and China. No other country has a comparable fund of accumulated experience in the application of external and internal pressures on neighbors for the purpose of softening them prior to conquest.

The third historic factor to which attention must be called in assessing Soviet attitudes to detente is the personal background of the elite which at the present time happens to govern the Soviet Union. This group rose to positions of power in the 1930s, in the turmoil of Stalin's purges and massacres--that is, under conditions of the most ruthless political infighting known in modern history. No ruling elite in the world has had to learn survival under more difficult and brutal circumstances. This elite is the product of a process of Natural Selection under which the fittest were those who knew best how to suppress everything normally regarded as human--where indeed any expression of human qualities was treated by the dictator as personal disloyalty and usually punished with arrest and death. No one dealing with Brezhnev and his colleagues ought ever to forget this fact.*

* Nor should it be left out of account that the generals who command Soviet Russia's military establishment are veterans of the most brutal war of modern history in which defeat spelled enslavement and eventual mass destruction of their nation.

The fourth historic fact bearing on detente is that the elite currently ruling the Soviet Union is for all practical purposes directly descended from a peasantry. This holds true also of those of its members whose parents were industrial workers or urban petty bourgeois (meshchane) because traditionally a major part of Russian industry was located in the countryside and much of the so-called urban population consisted of peasants temporarily licensed to reside in the cities. Now the Russian muzhik is a very complicated being: the secrets of his character form a puzzle which has occupied some of Russia's best minds. Certainly no quick characterization can succeed where some of the greatest writers have exerted their talents. However, as far as his social and political attitudes are concerned (and these alone matter where detente is concerned) it must be borne in mind that during the past three and a half centuries (the brief interlude 1861-1928 apart) the Russian peasant has been a serf--i.e., he had few if any legally recognized rights and was not allowed to own his land. He managed to survive under these conditions not by entrusting himself to the protection of laws and customs, but by extreme cunning and a single-minded pursuit of his own interest. This experience has left deep marks on the psyche of ordinary Russians. The world view of such people, including those running the Communist Party apparatus, is better studied from Russian proverbs (e.g., Dal's Poslovitsy russkogo naroda) than from the collected works of the "coryphaei" of Marxism-Leninism. Their basic thrust is that life is hard and that to survive one must learn to take care of oneself and one's own, without wasting much thought on others ("the tears of others are water"). Force is one of the surest means of getting one's way ("bei russkogo, chasy sdelaet"--"beat a Russian and he will build you a watch"). In personal relations, the Russian peasant always was and probably still is one of the kindest creatures on earth, and nowhere can a stranger in need be more certain of finding sympathy and help than in a Russian village. But these qualities of decency and empathy (unfortunately, much corrupted by the trauma of Stalinism) have never been successfully institutionalized: they tend to vanish the instant the Russian peasant leaves the familiar environment of personal contacts

to become a stranger among strangers. When this happens, he tends to view the world as a ruthless fighting ground, where one either eats others or is eaten by them, where one plays either the pike or the carp.

These various elements of historic experience blend to create a very special kind of mentality, which stresses slyness, self-interest, reliance on force, skill in exploiting others, and, by inference, contempt for those unable to fend for themselves. "Marxism-Leninism," which in its theoretical aspects exerts little influence on Soviet conduct, through its ideology of "class warfare" reinforces these existing predispositions.

Admittedly, history does not stand still. There are many examples on hand to show that great experiences or vastly changed conditions can alter a nation's psychology. The consciousness of a people and the mentality of its elite are constantly affected by life around them. But in the case of Russia, all the great national experiences, especially since 1917, have happened to reinforce the illiberal and antidemocratic impulses. It is surely unreasonable to expect that the increase of U.S.-USSR trade from \$1 billion to, say, \$10 billion a year, or agreements on joint medical research, or broadened (but fully controlled) cultural exchanges will wipe the slate clean of centuries of accumulated and dearly bought experience. Nothing short of a major cataclysm which would demonstrate that impulses rooted in its history have ceased to be valid is likely to affect the collective outlook of the Russian nation, and change it as defeat has changed the militarism of the Germans or Japanese, and the Nazi massacres have changed the pacifism of Jews. Until that happens, one can ignore Russia's historic tradition only at great peril.

* * *

B. Detente and Soviet Policy

In order to understand how, in view of what has just been said of its outlook on life, the Soviet government initiated a policy of

detente with the West, one must consider the situation in which the Soviet Union found itself after the death of Stalin.

Genealogically, detente is an offset from "peaceful coexistence" inaugurated by the Khrushchev administration nearly twenty years ago. But "peaceful coexistence" itself was much less of an innovation in Soviet foreign policy than world opinion, anxious to have the burden of the Cold War lifted from its shoulders, liked to believe. It had been an essential ingredient of Lenin's political strategy both before and after 1917 that when operating from a position of relative weakness one had to exploit "contradictions" in the enemy camp, and this entailed a readiness to make compacts with any government or political grouping, whatever its ideology. "Direct action" ran very much against his grain. In 1920, when he expelled the Anarchists from the Third International, the charge which he levied against them (and which his successors of the 1950s-1960s revived against the Chinese Communists) was a dogmatic rejection of the divide et impera principle. Both he and Stalin have made no secret of the fact that in their foreign policy dealings expediency was always the main consideration. Hitler was barely one year in power (into which he had been carried by a viciously anticommunist campaign) when Stalin made to him a public overture. At the XVIIth Party Congress, held in 1934, he announced his willingness to establish with Nazi Germany a relationship which today would be characterized as one of detente. The Soviet Union, Stalin declared on this occasion,

would never be swayed by alliances with this or that foreign power, be it France, Poland, or Germany, but would always base her policy on self-interest... Of course, we are very far from enthusiastic about [Hitler's] Fascist regime in Germany. But Fascism is beside the point—if only because Fascism in Italy, for example, has not prevented the USSR from establishing excellent relations with that country.¹

¹ I. V. Stalin, Sochinenia, XIII, 302, cited R. Hingley, Joseph Stalin, Man and Legend (London, 1974).

Inaugurating detentes (as well as calling them off) is for the USSR a relatively easy matter: there exist for such action ample historic precedent and more than adequate theoretical justification. A "soft" foreign line must, therefore, under no conditions be interpreted as prima facie evidence of a change in the basic political orientation of the Soviet Union.

Behind the "peaceful coexistence" drive inaugurated in the mid-1950s and reinforced by decisions made in the early 1970s, lay several considerations. Some of these had to do with the need to overcome the disastrous consequences of Stalin's rule; others, with changes in the world situation.

The most immediate task facing Stalin's successors was the need to give the country a chance to lick its wounds after twenty years of privations, terror, and bloodletting of unprecedented proportions. Stalin had assured himself that no opposition could endanger his dictatorship, but the price was draining the citizenry of all vitality. In the mid-1950s the population of the Soviet Union was spiritually exhausted, as can be confirmed by those who had a chance then to visit the country.

Looking beyond immediate exigencies, it was thought imperative to extricate the USSR from the diplomatic isolation into which Stalin's postwar intractability had driven it. During the Cold War the United States had succeeded in surrounding the Soviet Union with a ring of hostile political-military alliances which, whatever their efficacy, no government, least of all one as security conscious as the Soviet, could contemplate with equanimity. Direct assaults against this alliance system had proven fruitless; if anything, they intensified America's resolve to contain and isolate the Soviet Union. A different, more flexible and indirect strategy therefore was called for. One had to reopen friendly relations with countries of the Third World, especially the freshly liberated colonies of the West, which Stalin had rudely alienated. One also had to establish contacts with all kinds of political

groupings and movements of public opinion in the United States and Western Europe which, without being friendly to the Soviet cause, could nevertheless serve its purposes. In short, instead of following Stalin's (and Lenin's) dictum "who is not with us is against us," it was thought preferable to adopt for an indeterminate time the principle "who is not against us is with us."

The third problem confronting Stalin's successors derived from the development of strategic nuclear weapons. Stalin had ordered his military to provide him with a nuclear arsenal but it is doubtful whether he fully appreciated its implications. His successors seem to have realized that after Hiroshima nothing would ever be the same again. War with such weapons was suicidal and this meant that one could no longer count on mere quantitative and qualitative superiority in weapons to assure hegemony. This realization strengthened the resolve of the new leadership to depart from the strategy of confrontations with the United States.

Such appear to have been the principal considerations behind the decision, taken in 1954-1955, to reverse the "hard" line pursued by Stalin since the end of the war and adopt in its place a "soft" strategy. The plan was simple and attractive: by means of a reasonably long period of relaxation of internal and international tensions to energize the Soviet population and reinfuse it with the enthusiasm of the early years of Communism; to break the ring of alliances forged by the United States around the Soviet Union; to gain support of the Third World and public opinion in the West; and in this manner to initiate a gradual shift of the international balance of power in favor of the USSR. One of the implicit assumptions of this strategy was that during the era of "peaceful coexistence" the Soviet Union would greatly improve its economic potential, and by devoting a lion's share of the growing national product to defense, expand its military power so as to attain parity or even superiority vis-a-vis the United States. The end goal of this policy was to turn the tables on the United States and by containing the would-be container drive him into the corner into which he had driven the USSR during the Cold War.

The Khrushchev policy succeeded up to a point. The Third World responded enthusiastically to Soviet diplomatic overtures and offers of economic and military help. Western public opinion appeared surprisingly ready to forget Stalin and accept at face value professions of the Soviet government that it had no wish to export revolutions. America's leadership remained suspicious; but by persuading President Eisenhower to acknowledge in principle the necessity of renouncing war between their two countries, Khrushchev scored a major success. He planted an idea which, if adopted, would have caused the West to give up its strongest weapon against the Soviet Union--superiority in strategic weapons--without the Soviet Union being compelled in return to forfeit political and ideological warfare, at which it excelled.

This policy's principal failure was economic. In his exuberance, a kind of throwback to the early 1930s and First Five Year Plan, when his political career had begun, Khrushchev seems genuinely to have believed that given a fair chance, the Soviet economy, thanks to the advantages inherent in planning, would catch up and overtake the American. He also thought that this economic progress would buttress the massive shift in the international balance of power on which he counted to achieve an ultimate isolation of the United States. But being a rather primitive, common-sensical man (judging by his Memoirs), Khrushchev had little idea how much the world economy had changed since the days when he had helped Stalin lay the foundations of a Soviet industrial state. While he kept his eyes riveted on statistics of steel production, a technological revolution was reshaping the economies of the "capitalist" countries. After his removal, it became apparent to the new Soviet leadership that notwithstanding the upward movement of productive indices, Russia and its bloc were steadily falling behind America, Western Europe, and Japan.*

* "A scientific and technical revolution unprecedented in its rate and scope is now taking place in the world. And it is the communists, [those] who carried out the greatest social revolution, that should be in the front rank of the revolutionary transformations in science and technology. The CPSU believes that one of our most important tasks now is to accelerate scientific and technical progress, to equip the working people with modern scientific and technical knowledge, and to introduce as quickly as possible the results of scientific discoveries." L. I. Brezhnev, Pravda, 13 November 1968 cited in Foy D. Kohler and others, From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence, p. 168 (Miami, 1973).

A good indication of this fact was the decline in the Eastern bloc's participation in world trade. Between 1966 and 1973 the share of world exports of the USSR and the six "Peoples' Democracies" declined from 11.4 to 9.0 percent; Soviet Russia's share dropped from 4.3 to 3.4 percent.¹ These figures suggested that owing to some basic flaws-- technological backwardness, poor management, bad planning--the Communist countries were not only not catching up with the "capitalist" countries but were failing to keep pace with them; and this, in turn, meant that the automatic shift in the balance of power postulated by "peaceful coexistence" would not take place either.

Tackling this matter presented formidable difficulties; and it is testimony to the courage and capacity at objective analysis of the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership that they eventually acknowledged their problem and set themselves boldly to deal with it. Basically, they had only two alternatives. One was to carry out major internal reforms of the kind that had been discussed and even half-heartedly attempted in the late 1950s. This course posed political dangers. All proposals of economic reform in the Communist bloc called for some measure of decentralization of decisionmaking. But decentralization of the Communist economy always threatens to end up in decentralization of the political process, for where the state owns the economy there can be no firm line separating economics from politics, and no effective way of assuring that reform stays within safe limits. If there was any chance of the Politburo adopting the path of internal reform it was eliminated by the experience of Czechoslovakia in 1967-1968 which showed how quickly and irreversibly economic reform led to a breakdown of Communist controls.

So there was only the other alternative left: instead of economic reform, economic aid from abroad. It was easier to swallow the idea that all the Soviet economy needed to put it right was Western technical know-how than to concede that the fault lay with bureaucratic centralism:

¹ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 May 1974.

easier because to concede the latter meant to put in question the Soviet system as a whole. The decision, formally ratified at the XXIVth Party Congress in 1971, must have been accompanied by the most anxious soul-searching. It marked one of the major turning points in the history of the Soviet Union; and only the widespread contempt for and ignorance of history among people who occupy themselves with Soviet affairs explains why Western opinion has not been made aware of this fact. It had been one of the principal charges of the Bolsheviks before coming to power that Russia was an economic colony of the imperialist West, and one of their proudest boasts upon assuming power that they had freed Russia from this degrading dependence. The fact that fifty odd years after the Revolution, the Soviet Union, in the words of Chou En-lai, has to go "begging for loans" and put "its resources for sale"¹ is a tacit admission of stupendous failure. It signifies that notwithstanding all the human sacrifices and privations of the past half century, the Soviet system has not been able to generate the resources, skills, and enterprise necessary to keep the pace set by the allegedly wasteful, crisis-ridden free economies. The humiliation is extreme. To convey what it would mean in terms of American history one would have to imagine the United States in the 1850s, threatened by Civil War, concluding that after all it was incapable of governing itself and requesting Britain to help it out by temporarily assuming charge of its administration. The point needs emphasizing because only if one realizes how agonizing the decision to seek Western economic assistance must have been for Soviet leaders can one appreciate how desperate was the need that drove them to it and gain an idea of the price the West could demand for its help. It makes one much less anxious than the present U.S. Administration seems to be lest too hard bargaining on our part should cause the USSR to abandon detente.

¹ Speech of 18 February 1974 welcoming the President of Zambia (USSR and Third World, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 108).

C. Major Soviet Strategic Objectives of Detente

The national policy of the Soviet Union is characterized by a high degree of coordination. Since it is the same group of people--the Politburo--who bear ultimate responsibility for the totality of domestic and foreign policy, including economic planning, and all the branches of "culture," among them ideology and propaganda, they have no choice but to try to package their policies, as it were, into neat bundles, without loose ends. The kind of situation which exists in the United States where the Administration is pulling one way and the Congress another, where business is looking out for its own interests and the media for theirs, is, of course, unthinkable there. Even the most sanguine exponent of the "interest group" approach to Soviet politics would not go so far as to see them an arena of untrammelled competition. This effort at coordination, inherent in the Soviet system, facilitates the task of the foreign observer. Here we shall attempt to delineate in their broad outlines the principal tasks of the strategy of "peaceful coexistence" and detente, as perceived by Moscow. The analysis is based on what appear to be patterns of Soviet policy inside the country and the major areas of the world.

1. Inside the Soviet Union

Internally, the highest priority seems to be attached to security: that is, to preventing the idea of relaxation of tensions with the "capitalist" world leading to Soviet citizens questioning the necessity of preserving the dictatorial regime. To this end, the Party's leadership has emphatically committed itself to the line that detente does not mean an end to the conflict between "capitalism" and "socialism" or any convergence between the two systems.¹

¹ Numerous citations to this effect can be found in Foy D. Kohler, Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence (Miami, 1973).

It is one of the major tasks of the whole vast agitprop machinery in the USSR to keep up the "ideological strife" against hostile or alien ideologies, and to prevent any fudging of the lines separating the two systems. Increased internal controls, symbolized by the recent promotion of the head of the KGB to the Politburo, are part of that effort.

Related is the relentless drive to enhance Soviet Russia's military posture. We shall revert to this subject later on. Here it must be merely pointed out that the military effort is in no small measure inspired by the fear lest detente lead to internal relaxation and to a slow corruption of the system. It is as if Soviet leaders felt that by maintaining a steady tempo of armaments they were helping to maintain that state of tension which they require to keep the system from disintegrating.

The failure, promises notwithstanding, to give the population more consumers goods probably stems from the same motive. Consumerism, as Russian leaders had the opportunity to observe in the West, leads to a decline in public spirit and an addiction to comfort which significantly diminishes the state's ability to mobilize its citizenry.

2. Toward the United States

It has been one of the highest priorities of the Soviet Union in dealing with the United States to gain recognition as an equal, i.e., as one of two world "superpowers," and hence a country with the legitimate right to have its say in the solution of all international problems, even those which have no direct bearing on its national interests. Recognition of this status is essential because only by establishing itself in the eyes of the world as an alternate pole to that represented by the United States can the Soviet Union hope to set in motion the shift in the world balance of power which is the long-term aim of its foreign policy. To achieve and maintain it, the USSR requires an immense up-to-date military establishment with a devastating destructive capability: for

in Moscow's eyes to be a "superpower" means nothing more or less than to have the ability to initiate a nuclear holocaust.

It is very much in the interest of the USSR to induce the United States to renounce or at least limit (regulate) the use of those instruments of power politics at which it enjoys a pronounced advantage, and to do so without reciprocity. This means, in the first place, reducing to the maximum extent possible the threat of strategic nuclear forces. The various agreements into which the United States has entered with the USSR for the purpose of controlling and limiting the use of nuclear weapons have not been accompanied by any concessions on the part of the Soviet Union to restrain those instruments of power politics at which it is superior--namely, subversion and ideological warfare.

Because of its planned and coordinated character, and because of its notorious unwillingness to relegate authority further down the bureaucratic hierarchy, the Soviet system is intrinsically offensive-minded: that is, it prefers always to take the initiative, inasmuch as he who initiates an action has better control of his forces than he who responds to the actions of others. Time and again, when it has been forced to respond to firm initiatives (e.g., U.S. blockade of Cuba in 1962 or Israel's preemptive strike against the Arabs in 1967) the Soviet government has done so in a manner that suggested a mental state bordering on panic. For this reason it is very important for the Soviet Union to be aware at all times what its rivals' intentions are. The practice of regular U.S.-USSR consultations, instituted in the past decade, is greatly to the advantage of the Soviet leadership. The fact that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington has virtually free access to the President, and indeed travels on the same plane with the American Secretary of State to Moscow, assures the Politburo that it is reasonably well informed of major American initiatives before they occur. By terms of the U.S.-USSR agreement of 1973, each party is required to inform the other of any actions endangering their security or that of its allies. It is far from clear that the Soviet Union kept its part of the bargain in early October 1973

once it had learned of the impending Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel. It certainly was not either commended or criticized publicly by the U.S. Administration for its activities on this occasion. Yet it is more than probable that the Soviet Union would secure from the United States the relevant information should the situation be reversed.

Although it sometimes threatens to seek the capital and technology it requires in Western Europe and Japan, the Soviet Union has no viable alternative to the United States because it is only here that the capital is available in sufficient quantities. Furthermore, American corporations control worldwide rights to the most advanced technology which the Russians need. Part of the strategy of detente is to exploit the need of the U.S. economy for raw materials and markets to induce it to help carry out a fundamental overhaul and modernization of the economy of the Soviet Union.

3. Toward Western Europe

It seems probable that the long-term objective of Soviet foreign policy is to detach Western Europe from its dependence on the United States, especially where defense is concerned, and to make it, in turn, dependent on the USSR. It is difficult to conceive of any event that would more dramatically enhance Soviet power and tilt the "correlation of forces," so dear to its theorists, to its advantage. Russian military power resting on a West European economic base would give the USSR indisputable world hegemony--the sort of thing that Hitler was dreaming of when, having conquered continental Europe, he attempted to annex to it Soviet Russia's natural resources and manpower. However, the separation of Western Europe from the United States must not be hurried. The Soviet leadership has taken a measure of American politics and knows (whatever its propagandists may say) that it faces no danger from that side: after all, if the United States had any aggressive intentions toward the USSR it would have made its moves in the late 1940s or early 1950s when its monopoly on nuclear weapons allowed it to do so

with impunity. U.S. troops in Western Europe present no offensive threat to the Soviet Union. Their ultimate removal is essential if the USSR is to control Western Europe, but their purely defensive character does not seriously inhibit Russia's freedom of maneuver. What the Soviet Union fears is a German-French-English military alliance which might spring suddenly into existence should U.S. troops withdraw precipitately from Western Europe. The Russians have no delusions that close to the surface of what appears to be a "neutralist" Western Europe there lurk powerful nationalist sentiments which could easily assume militant forms. Nor do they forget that England and France have nuclear deterrents which they could put at West Germany's disposal. Hasty action on their part, therefore, could cause the emergence on their western flank of a nuclear threat probably much greater than that which they face in the East, from China, let alone from the United States. As long as the United States is in control of European defenses this development is not likely to occur. Hence the strategy is to hurry slowly.

The European security system for which the Russians have been pressing with moderate success for many years would, if realized, give them a kind of veto power over West European politics, military affairs included. It would make them arbiters of West European defense and thus preclude the emergence of an effective West European military force equipped with nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union is seeking to make the West European countries maximally dependent on the Eastern bloc, without, however, losing its own freedom of action. This end it seeks to achieve by the following means: promoting heavy indebtedness of the COMECON countries; gaining maximum control of West European energy supplies (oil, natural gas, fuel for nuclear reactors); and promoting "cooperative" arrangements with West European business firms. For its part, the USSR (the other COMECON countries to a lesser extent) seeks to confine Western economic aid to "turnkey operations" and similar devices which minimize

its dependence on foreign sources. In their dealings with Western Europe, the Russians like to insist on very long-term arrangements, which would have the effect of tying Western economies to the Soviet economic plans. In some cases they even propose deals that would run for up to fifty years.¹ The effect of such economic relations would be increasingly to connect the economies of Western Europe with those of the East.

4. Toward the "Third World"

The "third world" which interests the Soviet Union most is that which adjoins its very long and strategically vulnerable southern frontier that extends from the Black Sea to the Sea of Okhotsk. This is an area of primary importance to it and the scene of its greatest political and military activity. Africa and Latin America are for the time being of considerably lesser concern.

As noted above, winning over or at least neutralizing the "third world" is an intrinsic element of Soviet detente strategy. The isolation of the United States requires that it be ultimately deprived of access to the raw materials, cheap labor, and strategic bases available in the underdeveloped countries. However, one may doubt whether under present circumstances the Soviet Union would attach great priority to this strategic objective were it not for the complications arising from its conflict with Communist China. The Chinese are threatening the USSR from a flank which they had been always accustomed to regard as secure--namely, the political left. The Chinese are trying to wean away the radical and nationalist constituency in the underdeveloped countries which since 1917 had been viewed from Moscow as a safe preserve. The Soviet Union cannot allow China to do this, least of all in regions adjacent to its own territory, and this forces it to take vigorous counter-action. From East Africa to Southeast Asia a bitter fight is being waged between Russia and China for influence over the local governments.

¹ D. Lascelles, The Financial Times (London), 6 February 1974.

Though little spoken about in the press, it is probably the most important political struggle in the world at large today. By means of military and economic aid programs, the cost of which must represent a heavy burden to their economies, the two powers contend for allies and seek to expel the influence of their chief rival.

Apart from this effort to which it devotes a great deal of attention, Soviet strategy seeks cautiously to reduce Western influence in countries of the "third world," especially that of multinational corporations. Where it has to do with reasonably friendly native regimes it strives to encourage the movement toward socialism, on the assumption that socialist regimes are likely to be more hostile to the West. Elsewhere, it supports various movements of "national liberation," in part because it desires to be involved in promoting regimes which might eventually come to power (e.g., the Blacks of Mozambique and Rhodesia, and the Palestinian Arabs), in part because it is anxious to prevent these movements from falling under Chinese influence.

5. Toward Communist China

Having tried every means at its disposal from appeals to sentiment to threats of preemptive nuclear strike to bring China back into the fold, the Soviet Union appears to have settled on a patient strategy of containment. The immense military force concentrated on China's border assures that China will not lightheartedly challenge Soviet territory. The struggle in the rest of Asia, and in the left-wing, nationalist movements elsewhere, alluded to above has so far successfully prevented the Chinese from seizing control of major territorial or political bases against the USSR. One of the greatest benefits of detente for the Soviet Union has been the unwillingness of the United States to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict to its own advantage. If detente had no other justification, this one would probably suffice to keep it alive, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

Thus the Soviet Union appears to have decided not to exacerbate further relations with China, but to await opportunities for intervention in internal Chinese affairs which might open up after Mao's death. In the long run the USSR will very likely strive for a breakup of China into several independent territorial entities. After the experience with Mao, even the establishment of a pro-Moscow successor government in Peking would not still Russia's fears about China. A China separated by spacious buffer states (Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria) would be a far more comfortable neighbor to live with.

The political strategy outlined above suffers from obvious contradictions. It seems odd, for instance, to urge multinational corporations to invest in the USSR while striving to expel them from the "third world." Or to seek economic assistance from the United States while building up a military machine directed against these same United States. Or to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries while denying anyone the right to interfere in its own. But each of the adversaries of this policy tends to see only one facet, namely that which concerns himself, and to remain unaware of the whole picture, which facilitates the execution of what otherwise might have become an impractical line of conduct.

D. Soviet Tactics for Implementing Detente

At the very beginning of any discussion of Soviet methods of implementing detente, attention must be called to prudence as a feature common to all Soviet tactics. A certain paradox inheres in the Soviet Union: it is at the same time immensely strong and fatally weak. Its strength derives from the ability to marshal all the natural resources in the service of any chosen cause; its weakness, from the necessity always to succeed or at least appear to do so. The Soviet government does not possess a legitimate mandate to rule and it can never risk having its credentials in doubt. Failure effectively to apply force abroad, once it has been decided upon, would at once raise questions

in the minds of Soviet citizens about the regime's ability to cope with internal opposition; and any loss of public faith in the omnipotence of the regime (and hence in the futility of resistance to it) might prove the beginning of the end. Thus the Soviet regime finds itself in the extremely difficult situation of having to create the impression of a relentless advance forward and yet in fact move extremely slowly: it can act decisively only when it has a near one hundred percent assurance of success, which, of course, occurs rarely.

Related is the habit of overinsuring by keeping open all options. The Soviet leadership by ingrained habit never places its eggs in one basket. It maintains some form of contact with all foreign political parties, from extreme right to extreme left; it builds up conventional forces as well as nuclear ones, and simultaneously expands its naval arm--in all the branches it accumulates masses of weapons, old and new, just to be on the safe side; in its economic drive, once the decision to seek help abroad had been taken, it has sought to deal with everybody: the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and even such powers of second rank as Brazil. The lack of selectivity indicates insecurity lurking very close behind the airs of supreme self-confidence that Soviet leaders like to exude in public.

In our discussion of tactics we shall deal, successively, with political, military, and economic measures, concentrating, however, on Soviet operations vis-a-vis Western Europe.

1. Some Political Tactics

The basic political tactic employed by the USSR on a global scale since its acquisition of nuclear weapons has been to try to reduce all politics to the issue of preserving the peace. The line it advocates holds that the principal danger facing humanity today is the threat of a nuclear holocaust, for which reason anything that in any way risks

exacerbation of relations between the powers, and above all between the United States and the Soviet Union, is evil. This tactic has two advantages from the Soviet point of view:

- It offers it an opportunity to still external criticism of the Soviet Union: for no matter what the Soviet Union may do or fail to do, good relations with it must never be jeopardized. A crass example of this tactic is to be found in arguments advanced by the USSR and adopted by many Western politicians and commentators that the West should not support dissident movements inside the USSR, lest this exacerbate relations between the "superpowers" and increase the chance of war.
- It allows the Soviet Union to avoid questions touching on the nature of the peace which is to result from detente. Peace becomes an end in itself. The issue of freedom is relegated to the margin: for once survival is at stake, who is going to haggle over the conditions?

As has been suggested above, Soviet strategy in Europe is gradually to detach its Western half from the United States and bring it within the Soviet orbit. To achieve this end, the Soviet government works intensively to promote and make dependent on its good will parties and movements in the West which, whatever their motivation and attitude toward Communism, happen at a particular time to further this end. Soviet support of De Gaulle represents a clear example of this tactic. Once the French leader had set himself earnestly to reduce American influence on the continent, the USSR extended to him the hand of friendship, even though supporting him was an anti-Communist right. Very instructive, too, has been Soviet behavior in the recent French presidential election. Although Mitterand ran on a common ticket with the Communist Party and in the event of victory was committed to put ministerial posts at its disposal, the Soviet government treated him with reserve. The reason behind this coolness seems to have been not the fear of embarrassing the leftwing candidate and thus handing useful campaign ammunition to his opponent, but uncertainty about Mitterand's foreign policy views.¹ The same holds true of Moscow's behavior in

¹ H. Hamm, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 May 1974.

the U.S. presidential election of 1972. On the face of it, Russia could have been expected to support Senator McGovern, since he advocated drastic cuts in the defense budget and reductions in American military commitments abroad, Europe included. But the Democratic candidate seemed to appeal to isolationist sentiments which at this juncture are not in Soviet Russia's interest. The policy of detente postulates a U.S. administration willing to assume certain global responsibilities (at any rate, in the immediate future): any other would be unlikely to favor the huge loans, investments, and sharing of technical knowledge which the Soviet Union seeks from the United States. Further, as noted, Moscow fears a precipitate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe, as advocated by McGovern, preferring such a withdrawal to proceed piecemeal and in the context of a European "Security Pact." For these reasons Moscow backed President Nixon.

Such tactics require Moscow to have friendly access to all kinds of political groupings, no matter what their ideology. It could well happen that a party committed to anticommunism should also turn out to be very anti-American, in which case its attitudes toward the USSR could be temporarily overlooked. On the other hand, a Communist party in power might choose to pursue an independent foreign policy, harmful to Soviet interests. Thus it is not inconceivable, for instance, that in view of its advocacy of a "European" policy line, the Italian Communist Party may appear in Moscow's eyes a less palatable alternative to the present Christian-Democratic government than a "Fascist" one. In general, Moscow does not seem at all anxious to promote at this time Communist parties in Europe, apparently preferring to deal with parties of the center and to the right of it. Direct cooperation with the West European "Establishment" has proved very profitable. It is undoubtedly safer to exploit the desire for profits and peace of the "bourgeoise" than to incite the left and risk a backlash and even possibly open the door to Chinese penetration. The extreme caution exercised by Moscow and the Communist Party in Portugal, where the two have appealed to the nation to help General Spinoza, has undoubtedly been influenced by fear of Anarchism and Maoism.

A persistent element of Soviet policy toward Western Europe has been the effort to break up all economic and military blocs the existence of which obstructs Soviet objectives in this area. The Soviet Union did all it could to frustrate the establishment of the Common Market. Later, it reconciled itself to its existence. But the difficulties which the EEC has experienced in recent years must have revived hopes that it will fall apart or at least turn into a nominal institution. The behavior of the Western powers during the October 1973 war, when, ignoring their obligations to one another, each nation rushed to secure its own oil supplies, certainly was not lost on Moscow. In its economic dealings with Western Europe, the USSR favors bilateral arrangements which bypass the EEC and tend to weaken it further. As for NATO, of course, Moscow hopes to supplant it with a European "Security Pact" which would result in its dissolution.

The pursuit of Soviet strategy in the West entails a steady increase of Soviet intervention in the West's internal life. This effort, so far, has had very limited success, but it represents a development deserving greater attention than it ordinarily receives. In the United States, the Soviet Union has established a lobby, which can reveal an astonishing degree of activity. Represented by diplomats, journalists, and occasional delegates from the East, it operates on Capitol Hill, at business organizations, and at universities and learned societies, and has as its purpose the promotion of legislation favorable to the Soviet Union. Perhaps the lobby's most ambitious effort has been mounted against the Amendment introduced by Senator Jackson to the Trade Bill which would deny the USSR and other nonmarket economies Most Favored Nation status until they accord their citizens the right of unrestricted emigration. Great pressures have been brought to bear upon Senator Jackson and the cosponsors of his Amendment to have it withdrawn, in which, at various stages, the National Association of Manufacturers and leading figures of the Jewish community in the United States, acting in what they considered their constituents' best interests, were involved.

In the United States, these pressures to interfere with domestic politics have so far had little success. In Western Europe the Russians have been more fortunate. The idea is gaining acceptance in Western Europe that nothing must be done which could be interpreted in the USSR as endangering its security or challenging its prestige. An outstanding example of this is the willingness of Norway to prohibit international oil companies ("multinational monopolies") from exploring deposits under the waters along its northern sea coast, where the Soviet Union is anxious to keep NATO away from the sea lanes used by its naval units stationed at Murmansk. Negotiations in progress between the two governments seem to point to the recognition by Norway that oil exploration in this area will be carried out either by itself or in cooperation with the Soviet government.¹

Considerable pressures are being constantly exerted on European governments and associations to prevent the spread of literary works unfavorable to the Soviet Union and to isolate individuals and groups whom the Soviet government dislikes. (A minor but telling instance of such pressure involves reports that the Czech Chess Master Ludek Pachman, who had been a political prisoner in Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion, has been unable after his recent emigration to Western Europe to gain admission to internal tournaments; recently the Icelandic government has informally rejected a German offer to have him play as a member of the West German team on the grounds that this might annoy the Russians and prevent their participation.)²

In all, the results of these internal pressures leave much to be desired from the Soviet point of view, and one wonders whether they are

¹ C. Genrich, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 March 1974, and H. Kamer, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 9 June 1974.

² Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 January 1974. There also exist reports that the movie "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" will not be shown in Japan, because the film distributor Toho fears Soviet objections.

worth the effort (and bad publicity) which they cost. The unexpectedly firm behavior of certain European delegations at the Geneva Security Conference in discussions connected with "Basket Three" and involving human and cultural exchanges between East and West, indicates that powerful sectors of Western opinion not only will not tolerate Soviet repression but insist on the right to bypass the Soviet government and establish contact with its citizenry. Still, the matter deserves close watch: there are forces in the West which prefer conciliation at all costs and which, willingly or not, help the Soviet government gain acceptance of the principle—from which it alone can benefit—that because of its awesome military arsenal it must always be placated.

2. Military Policies

It is fair to say that the West has consistently underestimated the Soviet willingness and ability to pay for a large and up-to-date military establishment. Western policymakers have always hoped that sooner or later their Soviet counterparts would conclude that they have enough weapons and decide to devote a growing share of their "national product" to peaceful purposes. This has not happened, at any rate so far. The fallacy rests in part on a misunderstanding of Soviet attitudes to military instrumentalities (the belief that they are primarily motivated by feelings of insecurity) and partly from a stubborn willingness to believe Soviet promises to raise Russia's living standards.

The most likely explanation for the relentless Soviet military drive is that nearly all Communist expectations have been disappointed except the reliance on the mailed fist. The worldwide revolution which the Bolsheviks had expected to follow their seizure of power in Russia did not take place, and as early as the 1920s had to be given up as a realistic objective. The economic crises of the West on which they had counted did occur, but they failed to bring capitalism to its knees. Communist ideology, having gained the apogee of its influence in the 1930s, then lost its appeal, and today no longer attracts youth which,

Insofar as it looks for a radical alternative, prefers anarchism and the Chinese variety of revolutionary doctrine. After its giant achievements in the 1930s, the Soviet economy has not been able to keep up with the pace set by the free economies: the Soviet economic "model" can hardly attract emulators after the USSR itself has had to seek help outside. In other words, had the Soviet government chosen to rely on the appeal of its ideology or the accomplishments of its economy, it would have consistently found itself on the losing side. Military might alone has never disappointed. It won the Bolsheviks--in 1917, a tiny party--the Civil War which ensconced them in power. It saved the country from the Nazi invaders. It made it possible for Russia to occupy and retain Eastern Europe. Reinforced with a strategic nuclear arsenal, it has enabled the Soviet government to stand up to the United States and exact recognition as an equal. In short, military power has been the instrument by which a small band of emigre radicals gathered around Lenin managed first to capture power in Russia, then to defeat the greatest war machine of modern times, and finally to rise from the status of a pariah nation to become one of the world's two "superpowers." Merely to list these achievements is to gain an insight into the reason behind the single-minded obsession of Soviet leadership with military power. Anyone who counts on a deceleration of the Soviet military effort should be able to come up with some alternate instruments of international policy on which the Soviet leadership could rely with equal assurance of success.

It is no secret that the buildup of Soviet military forces in the 1960s and early 1970s has been phenomenal, and that, notwithstanding certain international agreements on arms limitations, it shows no signs of abating. There is some disagreement among experts whether this buildup bears a measurable relationship to legitimate Soviet defense interests, or has become an end in itself, a search for power for power's sake. There is no dispute, however, about the intensity of this effort, of the willingness of the government to allocate talent and money, of the dedication with which the armed forces maintain the martial spirit among the people. The Soviet leadership seems to strive

to obtain a marked superiority in all branches of the military, in order to secure a powerful forward-moving shield behind which the politicians can do their work.* To reach this objective, the Soviet Union must have open to it all the options: to be able to fight general and limited conventional wars, near its borders and away from them, as well as nuclear wars employing tactical and/or strategic weapons. The probability of this aim being given up is very low: only effective pressure from below by a population fed up with seeing so much of the national wealth disappearing in the military budget, could accomplish this--but for this to happen, something very close to a revolution would have to occur in Russia. So far, the Soviet government has shown itself willing to limit the production or employment only of those weapons where it either was bound to remain inferior to the United States or where further expansion seemed redundant. A good test of its readiness to agree to limitations where it is trying to catch up with the United States would be in the field of naval construction. It is a safe bet that should the U.S. government initiate such negotiations it would run into a stone wall.

An interesting feature of Soviet military activity in recent years is the practice of quietly establishing a presence in areas where, in the event hostilities broke out, Soviet forces would already be, as it were, in place, and could deploy for action. A case in point are Soviet incursions by air and naval units on NATO territories in the North Sea. Potentially even more dangerous are large Warsaw Pact maneuvers held in areas near major NATO troop concentrations. As is known, prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact troops had been put into a state of readiness in this manner. Something of the same tactic seems also to have been followed, possibly under Soviet guidance, by the Egyptians and Syrians in 1973 preparatory to their combined assault on Israel. The unwillingness of the USSR to agree to an exchange of warnings of such

* The three regions in which such shields seem to be in construction at this time are the North Atlantic, the littoral extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, and the Northwest Pacific.

exercises more than a few days in advance indicates that its military leaders contemplate the possibility of using maneuvers as cover for preparing offensive operations against NATO.

Finally, mention must be made of the tactic of "war by proxy." Detente in some measure cramps Soviet freedom of military action: it is a sine qua non of this policy that there must be no direct military confrontations between the United States and Soviet Union. To get around this limitation, the Soviet leadership seems to be developing a technique of indirect military involvement. In regions where it has a serious interest in expelling hostile influence (Western or Chinese) and yet fears to involve itself directly lest it scuttle detente, it seeks to achieve its aims through third parties. It arms and provides for its allies diplomatic protection; in the event of disaster, it pledges an all-out effort on their behalf; but it does not commit its own forces (at any rate, to any major extent). In this manner, it can profit greatly should its associates prove successful, yet limit the damage should they fail--and all the time keep the "dialogue" of detente going. The first major "war by proxy" was the Indian-Pakistani war; the second, the October War in the Middle East. It seems possible that the Soviet Union might attempt similar action in the future using Iraq and Afghanistan to assail Iran, or India and Afghanistan to liquidate Pakistan.

3. Economic Policies

The primary objective of Soviet economic policy abroad during the era of detente is to reconstruct and modernize the Soviet industrial establishment. But, as noted, under the Communist system economics is never considered in isolation from politics, and every economic policy is measured in terms of its likely political consequences.

The principal political result desired is increased dependence of the Western economies--and therefore, as a corollary, of Western

governments--on the Soviet Union. We may single out three means by which this dependence can be accomplished: control of energy supplies, indebtedness, and manipulation of West European labor.

The Soviet government seems to have realized earlier than its Western counterparts how great had become the reliance of modern economies on energy, especially oil, and to have initiated steps to obtain control of it. The single-minded persistence with which the USSR, its failures notwithstanding, has advanced its influence in the Middle East has had (and continues to have) as one of its prime motives the desire to establish a hold over the oil supplies of that region. Should the Soviet Union succeed in filling the military vacuum created by the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and American reluctance to commit forces there, it would be in a superb position to exercise a stranglehold on European and Japanese fuel supplies. The October 1973 war unmistakably demonstrated how low Europe would stoop to assure the flow of its oil.

The Soviet Union has also been very active in seeking to establish itself as a major fuel supplier to the West. It already furnishes respectable amounts of oil and natural gas to Germany and Italy, and everything points to the expansion of these deliveries. The projected trilateral deal involving supplies of natural gas from Iran to the USSR to be matched by Soviet deliveries to Germany would, if realized (which, at the time of writing, seems doubtful), further enhance Soviet control over West European energy requirements. The same applies to bids (consistently below those made by U.S. firms) to furnish enriched uranium to West European nuclear reactors. All this creates conditions of dependence which the USSR could exploit, should the need arise, no less successfully than the Arab oil producers did last fall. It goes without saying that the ambitious plans for U.S.-USSR cooperation in developing Siberian oil and gas fields would give the USSR similar leverage vis-a-vis the United States.

In monetary matters, the Soviet Union has traditionally pursued a very conservative policy. Its patient accumulation of gold reserves, at the time when the world offered much better forms of investment, was part and parcel of the "bourgeois" approach to fiscal matters characteristic of Communists. In recent years, however, the Soviet government appears to have thrown its traditional caution overboard and gone all out for foreign borrowing. The same applies to the "Peoples' Democracies." The obligations assumed are onerous, because before long the Soviet Union will have to set aside a good part (perhaps one-half) of its precious hard currency earnings for debt servicing. In part, this untypically risky policy may be influenced by the belief that inflation will cause a disastrous depreciation of Western currencies while enhancing the value of the raw materials which the Soviet Union can supply. (If this is indeed so, this calculation leaves out of account the possibility that inflation could lead to a depression which would severely curtail the market for primary materials; but then, perhaps, the Soviet leaders assume that this time a worldwide depression would indeed be followed by a collapse of the "capitalist" system which would wipe out their debts altogether.) Another consideration may have to do with the psychology of the debtor-creditor relationship. Heavy Soviet indebtedness to Western governments and banks produces among the latter a vested interest in the preservation and well-being of the Soviet Union, and improves the chances of a continuous flow of credits.

Studies carried out by specialists in the field of East-West economic relations¹ indicate that the degree of interdependence so far

¹ J. and P. Pinder, "The Balance of Market Power in Europe: a Means of Soviet Influence over the European Community?" (and) M. Kaser and P. Hanson, "Elements of Soviet Economic Dependence on Western Europe," both papers prepared for the Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, in the spring of 1974.

created is not great. But the tendency is there; and should Moscow succeed in realizing its more ambitious economic "cooperation" plans involving "capitalist" economies, the interdependence would attain a level at which political consequences of the most serious nature would be bound to ensue.

The steady growth in advanced modern economies of the service sector and the difficulties of rationalizing it beyond a certain point has resulted in a growing labor shortage; and that, in turn, has enhanced the power of organized labor. In some advanced industrial countries--Great Britain, for example--the trade unions have acquired a virtual veto over government policies. It may be expected that barring a depression this power will continue to grow.

This development makes it very important for the Soviet Union to heal the breach between those foreign trade unions which are Communist-controlled, and therefore in some measure manipulatable by it, and the free trade unions either run by socialists, Catholics, etc., or lacking in any political affiliation. One of the most important byproducts of the American-Soviet detente has been to make Communism respectable in labor circles and to make it difficult for democratic trade unionists to resist pressures for increased contacts and joint action with Communist and Communist-dominated trade union organizations. In the past two years, the Soviet Union has succeeded in healing the breach created in 1949 when the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions broke up due to the secession from it of democratic labor organizations. The quarantine on Communist trade unionism, in effect during the past quarter of a century, seems to have broken down. With the active support of the British Trade Union Congress and the West German Federation of Labor, the head of the Soviet trade unions, Shelepin (a one-time KGB head!) has persuaded European labor leaders to agree to a joint conference at the end of 1974. That meeting may well presage an era of collaboration and end up in the free trade unionism falling under the sway of the better financed

and centrally directed Communist movements.¹ Penetration of European labor, of course, would give Soviet leadership a superb weapon for influencing or even blackmailing West European industry.

E. Current Soviet Assessment of Detente

What, from Moscow's vantage point, has been the balance sheet of "peaceful coexistence" and detente to date?

On the debit side of the ledger two results deserve emphasis:

- The quarrel with China. The foreign policy pursued by the post-Stalinist leadership has served primarily the national interests of the Soviet Union, not those of the Communist community at large. This had been the case even before 1953: as Stalin's words, cited above, explicitly assert, and as the historic record amply demonstrates, the guiding principle of Soviet foreign policy has always been "national" self-interest. But before 1953, Soviet Russia had been the only major power with a Communist regime and one could argue with a certain logic that what was good for the USSR was good for Communism. After all, the small East European regimes, put in power by the Red Army, hardly counted (except for Yugoslavia, which quickly fell out with Moscow). China, however, was a great power in its own right, and it would not tolerate a policy among whose primary objectives was an arrangement with the United States intended to elevate the USSR to the status of a "superpower." Neither references to Lenin's lessons on strategy and tactics, nor arguments based on expediency, nor threats achieved their desired result. The Chinese remained stubbornly convinced that the ultimate winner from detente would be either the Soviet Union, or the United States, or both, but never China, and they reacted with the fury of the betrayed.
- A certain degree of loss of internal control. For this, detente is only partly responsible. The abolition of indiscriminate terror and the intellectual "thaw" of the mid-1950s were principally inspired by the wish to reinvigorate the country and reinfuse it with enthusiasm for the Communist cause. Detente, however, undoubtedly accelerated the process

¹ A. Beichman, International Herald-Tribune, 26-27 January 1974.

by which society in the USSR began to resist totalitarian controls. An authoritarian-demotic regime must have a threat with which to frighten the population into granting it unlimited powers: Napoleon had his "Jacobins," Lenin and Stalin their "counterrevolutionaries" and "interventionists", Hitler his "Jews" and "Communists." Detente in some measure de-Satanizes the external threat and thereby undermines the Soviet regime's claim to unquestioned obedience. To proclaim the Cold War over--even while repeating ad nauseam that the struggle between the two systems must go on to the bitter end--is to put in question the need in Russia for a repressive regime. It makes it that much more difficult to justify tight controls over foreign travel and over access to information. Implicit in detente is also a certain respect for foreign opinion. To project the image of a country worthy of being a partner of the Western democracies, the Soviet regime cannot simply shoot people for holding unpalatable ideas. The presence of Western correspondents in the USSR has given Soviet dissenters a powerful weapon with which to neutralize the KGB, at any rate, where better known public figures are concerned. All this is not without long-term dangers for the regime.

On the credit side of the ledger there are the following achievements:

- The USSR has indubitably achieved the status of an equal partner of the United States. All major international decisions are now acknowledged to require Soviet participation and acquiescence; none are likely to be taken which seriously threaten Soviet interests. The Soviet Union has at last become a world power. Russia's international prestige is greater than it ever been in the country's one thousand years of history.
- The USSR has succeeded in smashing the ring of alliances forged around it by the United States during the late Stalin era. NATO is in disarray; the other alliance systems lead only a paper existence. For its own part, the USSR has succeeded in establishing a strong political and military presence in the Middle East, where its good relations with the Arab countries and India have helped her in considerable measure to eject Western influence and establish the position of a regional "patron." Countries which at one time had been solidly wedded to the United States--Germany, Japan, and the states

of southeast Asia, for example--find it increasingly * necessary to conduct an "even-handed" foreign policy.

- On the terms of detente, as laid down by the Brezhnev administration and tacitly accepted by President Nixon, the Soviet Union has not been seriously inhibited in carrying on its assault on the "capitalist" system. It has remained free to support "national liberation" movements (without risking similar actions against territories lying within its own orbit); it has been able to encourage "wars by proxy"; it has been able to lobby and exert pressure abroad.
- Detente has secured the Soviet Union recognition, by West Germany, of its conquest of East Germany: it has legitimized the existence of two Germanys. Should the Security Conference work out as Moscow hopes it will, Russia's control and occupation of East Germany would become internationally recognized. By inference, such a Security Conference would also legitimize Russia's conquests of the rest of Eastern Europe. Such recognition is of great importance to it because it helps undermine whatever hope the peoples of Eastern Europe may still entertain of some day being freed of Soviet occupation armies and the regimes which keep them in power. It also makes it possible to begin to think of some day incorporating Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union.
- Detente has already led to a considerable growth of Western investments in the Soviet economy and, if continued, should help the Russians overcome some of the most glaring deficiencies plaguing it. Especially attractive are long-term "cooperation" plans which tie the Western economies to the Soviet, without creating undue Soviet dependence on the West.

It is thus fair to say that, on balance, detente has proved a profitable political strategy for the Soviet Union. It has vastly enhanced the international position of the Soviet Union and enlarged its room for maneuver, while, at the same time, legitimizing its conquests

* In this connection it is interesting to note that polls conducted in recent years in West Germany and Japan have revealed a significant shift in the public's attitude toward the USSR: while Russia's popularity remains very low, a large part of the inhabitants of both countries have come to regard "good relations" with the USSR as essential to their security. In Germany 19 percent of the voters polled thought good relations with the USSR to be more important than good relations with any other country, the United States included.

and strengthening its economy. The cost—alienation of China and internal restlessness--has been high, but apparently the Soviet leadership feels that it can prevent both dangers from getting out of hand. This explains why the Soviet leadership is vigorously pressing for detente to continue. There is every reason to expect that it will persist in so doing, no matter what the obstacles and frustrations, because as now defined and practiced, detente primarily benefits the Soviet Union.

F. Suggested U.S. Policy Toward Detente

There was a time in the United States when to question the country's policy of "containment" and the Cold War exposed a person to the charge of disloyalty. Today, to question the readiness of the USSR to enter into a genuine detente with the West, or to criticize the manner in which relations with the Soviet Union are carried out, is to run the risk of being labeled a "Cold Warrior." Clearly such labels are obstructions to understanding. The issue lies not in labels but in trying to find a reasonable and realistic policy. That can be achieved only if the motives or intentions of the critics of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union are considered as no less decent than those of its supporters.

A sound policy toward the Soviet Union requires that two objectives never be lost sight of:

- Its effects on the internal situation in the Soviet Union. Our policies must be so contrived that they discourage those tendencies which make this country's government behave in the traditional pike-carp fashion. And this means, above all, that everything must be done to enhance the role of the population (society, obshchestvo) in the political and economic process. A detente policy which is based solely on a government-to-government relationship is subject to political vicissitudes and thus, by its very nature, unstable. It also strengthens the centralist, authoritarian tendencies of the Soviet regime. To some extent, such a policy entails "intervention" in the internal affairs of the USSR: but then insofar as detente rests on the assumption that the whole world has become one, intervention--as long as it is not pursued by force--is right and proper.

- Its effect on the national interest of the United States. Concessions to the Soviet Union, whatever form they take (recognition of East Germany, sale of grain at artificially deflated prices, access to U.S. capital markets) should always be accompanied by Soviet concessions: not pledges redeemable in the future, but instant repayment—a practice vital given the absence of regular government succession procedures in the USSR and the facility with which the Soviet Union can reverse its policies and renege on its obligations. Instantaneous reciprocity, or barter of concessions, ought to lie at the heart of U.S.-USSR relations at all times.

SOVIET STRATEGY FORMULATION AND COORDINATION:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE PILOT STUDY AND
OBSERVATIONS ON THE WORKING HYPOTHESIS

Richard B. Foster and Richard Pipes

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The paper presents the preliminary findings of the Pilot Study and
observations on the SRI/SSC "working" hypothesis relating to Soviet
strategy and foreign policy.

SOVIET STRATEGY FORMULATION AND COORDINATION: PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS OF THE PILOT STUDY AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE WORKING HYPOTHESIS

These can be divided into findings of a methodological and substantive nature.

A. Methodological Findings

The utility of a theoretical framework in terms of the Pilot Study Working Hypothesis is illustrated by the following findings:

1. A group of European scholars working independently without doctrinal guidance emphasized in their input papers the same or similar Soviet strategy planning and implementation.

2. There is an immense amount of open literature concerning Soviet foreign policy in all of its dimensions that needs analysis within a framework of a theoretical premise; without such a theoretical premise the data are of little use.

3. There is little difference noted in the Pilot Study between the open and "closed" literature on a number of crucial questions concerning Soviet foreign policy and national strategy.

4. Finally, the study illustrated the necessity for a simultaneous research of both Soviet "high strategy" theory as a framework, and the overt implementation of Soviet foreign policy and strategy in specific regions of the globe. Conversely, the Pilot Study also illustrates the futility of independent investigations of either theory alone or Soviet practice and limitation of foreign policy by itself.

B. Substantive Findings Regarding Soviet Foreign Policy

1. The Soviet commitment to a detente policy appears far deeper than might have been expected at its beginning in terms both of the flexibility it gives to the West (detente is not "fragile"), and the level and depth of a nonideological dialogue that the West might expect to conduct with Soviet scholars and other elite.

2. The commitment of the Soviets to detente has made them far more careful of wars by proxy, but they are now pursuing an alternative policy which is more loosely structured with respect to regional balances of power. In this new policy the Soviets have found they can turn over large-scale military aid in terms of both equipment and training to foreign powers whose interests more coincide with Soviet regional interests (e.g., India vs. Pakistan, Iraq/Syria vs. Iran, North Vietnam vs. South Vietnam, South Yemen vs. Saudi Arabia).

3. Soviet participation with Egypt and Syria in the preparations for the October 1973 war was not a form of "surprise attack" planning by the Soviet Union; rather the conception, planning, and execution of the October war for Egypt and Syria limited Soviet participation.

4. Although the Soviets have exploited the oil crisis (both the embargo and price increase) in terms of the effect on the Western alliance system and international economies, oil is a two-edged sword: in the near future Soviets may experience an oil shortage forcing the East European COMECON nations to be in the world market, a fact which will have a profound effect on Soviet influence and on other COMECON countries.

5. In the pursuit of foreign policy the Soviet government has learned to utilize the best social science information available (e.g., research institutes of the Academy of Science, state committees, etc.) rather than depend on individual intelligence games or ideological preconceptions.

6. Among the priorities guiding Soviet foreign policy, political considerations--the preservation, legitimization, and expansion of authority--almost invariably take precedence over economic or ideological considerations.

7. At the present stage of history, the USSR prefers the "capitalist" world to be politically and economically stable, in part because it desires massive economic aid from abroad and in part because it fears that in situations of instability power may be taken over either by anti-Russian elements, directed by China, or by communist parties with a nationalist bent.

8. The USSR does not view military power exclusively as a means of imposing its will by force: it also considers it to have high political-psychological value in forcing acceptance of its wishes without resort to violence. It is quite possible that its military forces in Eastern Europe are primarily deployed to this end.

9. The growing East-West economic relationship creates ties of mutual dependence which have not as yet carried with it a political dependence of West on East but which may do so in the future.

10. In pursuing its strategy in the West, the Soviet Union makes extensive use of traditional, status quo parties and lobbies; in particular, it is paying increasing attention to labor unions as a means of exerting pressure on the Western economy and thereby, indirectly, on Western governments.

11. In its medium-range strategy toward the West, the USSR counts on a steady shift of the "correlation of forces" in its favor. Involved in this calculation are the following factors:

- a. The West, being compelled under the threat of war, cold or not, to acknowledge the permanence of the status quo in the Eastern bloc without insisting on corresponding assurances concerning its own realm, will steadily shrink in territory and influence;

- b. The Communist bloc's military force will be built up to the point where the notion of resistance to it in the West as well as in the areas occupied by Communist troops (Eastern Europe) will appear futile;
- c. The West will become increasingly interlocked with the Eastern bloc economically, especially in matters of energy supply;
- d. The Western labor movement will come under Communist influence and provide the Russians with an opportunity to impose a stranglehold on the Western economy even more powerful than that exercised presently by the oil-producing countries.

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